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1. INTRODUCTION
The House Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs convened a
hearing in March 2009 to discuss al-Shabaab recruitment in America. In that hearing, Somalia
expert Ken Menkhaus discussed the historical antecedents of Somalia’s premier terrorist
organization, known as al-Shabaab, meaning “the youth.” For over 22 years Somalis have
endured “complete state collapse, periods of civil war, chronic insecurity, lawlessness and
warlordism, massive displacement” and associated tragedies. In lieu of a viable central
government, Somalis over time created for themselves informal local systems of governance.
Many of these local systems of governance came to rely on clan-based sharia courts to provide
law and order, and Islamic charities to provide basic social services. Due to the success of the
sharia courts and Islamic charities, many Somalis began to feel that Islamic governance was the
solution to Somalia’s crisis.
Al-Shabaab appeared on the scene at a time when Somalia was on the verge of forming a
stable central government. In 2006, “a loose coalition of Islamists and local sharia courts”
coalesced to govern Somalia. Known as the Islamic Courts Union, or the ICU, this coalition
relied heavily on one of its militia wings, al-Shabaab, to defeat Mogadishu’s warlords. Initially,
it appeared the ICU was going to provide Somalia with much needed stability. Unfortunately,
Islamist hardliners within the ICU soon overpowered the moderates and compelled the ICU to
adopt radical policies. These hardliners repeatedly provoked Ethiopia, prompting Ethiopia to
invade Somalia in December 2006. In the face of an overwhelming military offensive, the ICU
leadership and al-Shabaab were forced to flee.
Not surprisingly, the Ethiopian invasion produced a tremendous backlash. Relations
between Somalia and Ethiopia “have historically been rancorous”; the two countries fought a
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bloody war from 1977-1978, and Ethiopia is, of course, a Christian nation. Thus, from both a
nationalist perspective and a religious perspective, the Ethiopian occupation was infuriating.
Within weeks an insurgency, which included al-Shabaab, began attacking Ethiopian forces and
the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), “a weak Somali government widely perceived at
the time to be a puppet of Ethiopia.” Instead of treading lightly, Ethiopian forces and the TFG
employed harsh counterinsurgency tactics, which “inadvertently fueled a dramatic rise in
radicalism and violent extremism in the country and among the diaspora.”1
Al-Shabaab capitalized on these sentiments by conflating its jihadist rhetoric with Somali
nationalism. Even though most Somalis were opposed to al-Shabaab’s radical Islamist ideology,
they believed al-Shabaab’s armed resistance to the Ethiopian occupation was justified and hence
supported al-Shabaab’s actions. Burgeoning popular support allowed al-Shabaab to break away
from the old ICU leadership in 2007 and proclaim itself the leader of the insurgency. Since that
time al-Shabaab has been, without question, the strongest militia force in Somalia.
An estimated one million Somalis have fled the country since the late 1980s and now live
in communities all over the world. About 150,000 Somalis live in the United States,
concentrated mostly in Minneapolis, Minnesota and Columbus, Ohio.2 Al-Shabaab realizes that
to succeed in establishing an Islamic state in Somalia it needs the assistance of these diaspora
communities. It should come as no surprise, then, that young Somalis residing in diaspora
communities, including ones in the United States, are being targeted for recruitment.
In 2011, the House Committee on Homeland Security conducted yet another
investigation into the threat posed by al-Shabaab and its efforts to radicalize and recruit Somali-
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Ken Menkhaus, Violent Islamist Extremism: Al-Shabaab Recruitment in America, Statement before the
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, House of Representatives, March 11, 2009.
2
Ibid.
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Americans. After interviewing dozens of current and former counterterrorism officials, scholars,
diplomats, and other experts the committee presented these findings:
1) At least 40 or more Americans have joined al-Shabaab
2) At least 15 Americans have been killed fighting with al-Shabaab
3) At least 21 Americans remain unaccounted for and pose a direct threat to the U.S.
homeland
Al-Shabaab’s recruitment of Americans is particularly worrisome because, according to the
Committee, al-Shabaab has openly pledged loyalty to al-Qaeda and has cemented “alarming”
operational ties to it. The Committee warns that al-Shabaab has the intent and capability to
conduct attacks or aid al-Qaeda in striking U.S. interests and the U.S. homeland.3
In his testimony before the Committee, W. Anders Folk raised four concerns regarding
al-Shabaab recruitment of U.S. citizens:
1) The possibility that recruits might receive military training, combat experience, and
religious indoctrination justifying violence against innocent people, and then return to
the United States to either put those experiences to use or to recruit others to do the
same.
2) The strong social and family networks that individuals leaving the United States
maintain when they travel to Somalia to join al-Shabaab enhances the reach-back
capability of al-Shabaab to continue recruiting and fund-raising in the United States,
thus enhancing the organization’s ability to function.
3) The recruiting of U.S. citizens allows al-Shabaab access to identification and travel
documents that permit travel and access to and within the United States.
4) Recruiting U.S. persons provides international terrorist organizations with inside
knowledge about the United States that makes it easier to operate within the United
States and to teach others to do the same.4
Counterterrorism officials rightly fear that American al-Shabaab fighters who have not been
identified could return to the U.S. undetected. Al-Shabaab’s American recruits clearly present a
3

U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security, Majority Investigative Report, Al Shabaab:
Recruitment and Radicalization within the Muslim American Community and the Threat to the Homeland, July 27,
2011, http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/Investigative%20report.pdf (accessed August 31,
2011).
4
W. Anders Folk, Al Shabaab: Recruitment and Radicalization within the Muslim American Community and
the Threat to the Homeland, Statement before the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, July
27, 2011, http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/Testimony%20Folk.pdf (accessed September 3,
2011).
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significant threat to the homeland. Academics can help counterterrorism officials prevent
radicalization of Americans for jihad in Somalia by researching and explaining the radicalization
process. Al-Shabaab radicalization is a phenomenon unlike anything the U.S. has ever
encountered. Because al-Shabaab is such a unique terrorist organization, past radicalization
models may not apply. This study seeks to explain radicalization specifically as it relates to alShabaab.
In terms of the radicalization of Americans for jihad in Somalia, this study seeks to
answer two questions:
1) What are the most important factors in the radicalization al-Shabaab’s American recruits?
2) How do the radicalization pathways for Somalis and non-Somalis compare?
The first question examines the radicalization process for the sample as a whole. The second
question examines the radicalization processes for two sub-samples. The methodology section
of this thesis will explain how each question will be addressed.

4

2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Scholars and analysts have come up with various conceptual frameworks for examining
the factors that lead to radicalization. The most prominent among these divides the
radicalization process into three categories: situational, psychological, and social. In his
landmark work, Understanding Terror Networks, Sageman profiled 172 terrorists using social,
psychological, and situational variables.5 Bakker used the same variables as Sageman to profile
242 terrorists in Europe from September 2001 to August 2006. Bakker then compared these
terrorists to the 172 terrorists in Sageman’s study.6 Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman collected
data on 117 homegrown terrorists in the United States and the United Kingdom through the end
of 2008. However, instead of examining the data using situational, psychological, and social
variables, Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman focused on specific behavioral changes that terrorists
went through as they radicalized.7
An oft-cited 2007 NYPD study, titled Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown
Threat, divided radicalization into four phases: pre-radicalization, self-identification,
indoctrination, and jihadization. In this study, pre-radicalization was synonymous with
situational variables, self-identification with psychological variables, and indoctrination and
jihadization with social variables.8 A 2007 study conducted by the Danish Ministry of Justice
developed a four-phase process of radicalization that is practically identical to the process
5

Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004),

vii.
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Edwin Bakker, Jihadi Terrorists in Europe (Netherlands Institute of International Relations, December 2006),
7-8, 52, http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2006/20061200_cscp_csp_bakker.pdf (accessed October 22, 2011).
7
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Laura Grossman, Homegrown Terrorists in the U.S. and U.K.: An Empirical
Examination of the Radicalization Process (Center for Terrorism Research, FDD, April 2009), 27, 29,
http://www.defenddemocracy.org/stuff/uploads/documents/HomegrownTerrorists_USandUK.pdf (accessed
February 17, 2012).
8
Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat (NYPD Intelligence
Division, 2007), 6-7, http://www.nypdshield.org/public/SiteFiles/documents/NYPD_ReportRadicalization_in_the_West.pdf (accessed October 18, 2011).
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developed by the NYPD, with the phases as follows: pre-radicalization, conversion and
identification, conviction and indoctrination, and action. As in the NYPD study, the first phase
looked at situational factors, the second phase looked at psychological factors, and the third and
fourth phases looked at social factors.9
Usually scholars and analysts attempt to work within the standard conceptual framework,
or at least some aspect of it, while focusing on a certain radicalized population. In a notable
work titled Radical Islam Rising, Wiktorowicz conducted a detailed case study of alMuhajiroun—a radical Islamic movement based in the United Kingdom. Wiktorowicz found
that joining the al-Muhajiroun movement is a multi-step process. First an individual must
experience a “cognitive opening,” which opens him up to alternative belief systems. With an
open mind the individual begins a process of religious seeking, and at some point during this
process he is exposed to the movement. If the individual accepts the movement’s sacred
authority as legitimate, he undergoes a process of socialization whereby he learns the
movement’s ideological tenants. Once the individual accepts the movement’s ideology he is
eligible for formal membership.10
Often the radicalized communities in question are ethnic diaspora. Past radicalization
studies have focused on ethnic diaspora in Europe, although a few of them have singled out the
Somali-American diaspora for investigation. Weine and others examined radicalization and
recruitment of Somali-American youth and young adults from a psychological perspective. The

9

Thomas Precht, Home Grown Terrorism and Islamist Radicalisation in Europe: From Conversion to
Terrorism. (Danish Ministry of Justice, December 2007), 34,
http://www.justitsministeriet.dk/fileadmin/downloads/Forskning_og_dokumentation/Home_grown_terrorism_and_I
slamist_radicalisation_in_Europe_-_an_assessment_of_influencing_factors__2_.pdf (accessed October 27, 2011).
10
Quintan Wiktorowicz, Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West (Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers, 2005), 206-209.
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researchers identified various “push” and “pull” factors competing for the attention of vulnerable
youth and young adults.11
Within the framework described above, scholars and analysts have developed a multitude
of specialized theories to explain radicalization. Typically these theories model radicalization
within a specific community—usually an ethnic diaspora. As such, these theories are not always
applicable to radicalized communities across the board. In reality, there is no one-size-fits-all
theory; different combinations of theories must be assembled to explain radicalization in
different contexts. The “right” combination varies depending on the community in question.
This study attempts to find a suitable combination of theories to explain al-Shabaab
radicalization among U.S. citizens. Since al-Shabaab’s recruits are not a homogenous bunch,
just one theory package will not suffice. There are several suitable radicalization theories to
draw upon when examining al-Shabaab’s American recruits—some are based on situational
variables, some on psychological variables, and some on social variables.
2.1 Situational Theories
Situational theories, although they have been in use for quite some time, are still hotlydebated. Sageman empirically tested popular situational explanations of radicalism by focusing
on the background of a group of global Salafi mujahedin. Sageman found that, contrary to
popular belief, members of the global Salafi jihad were generally middle-class, well-educated,
married young men. However, Sageman also found that, although most of the mujahedin had
strong occupational skills, few were employed full-time. Sageman suggests that the mujahedin’s

11

Stevan Weine and others, “Community and Family Approaches to Combating the Radicalization and
Recruitment of Somali-American Youth and Young Adults: A Psychological Perspective.” Dynamics of
Asymmetric Conflict 2, no. 3 (November 2009): 192, http://0web.ebscohost.com.lib.utep.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=3&hid=111&sid=d66a10af-90b1-4901-9ac9c0b0ffb4053a%40sessionmgr113 (accessed September4, 2011).
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underemployment supports relative deprivation theory, a psychological theory which the author
will discuss later.12
Bakker found, in contrast to Sageman’s findings, that most jihadi terrorists in Europe
were from low-class backgrounds, which makes sense given most of them were migrants. He
also found that although most jihadi terrorists in Europe had poor occupational skills, many were
employed full-time. Finally, Baker found that a substantial proportion of jihadi terrorists were
single, as opposed to married.13 Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman, in their study on homegrown
terrorists in the U.S. and U.K., discovered that the terrorists in their sample were less privileged
and less educated than terrorists in Sageman’s sample. Like Bakker, the authors also found that
the majority of terrorists in their sample were unskilled laborers.14 The results of both of these
studies seem to contradict those of Sageman.
Situational theories, due to their controversial nature, are difficult to employ in academic
settings. A report by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) titled Radicalization: A
Guide for the Perplexed highlights certain popular situational theories that remain controversial.
For example, the notion that poverty and lack of education breeds terrorism may not be entirely
true—all of the eight suspects behind the botched 2007 Glasgow International Airport attack
were professionals, and all of the members of the 9/11 the Hamburg Cell were enrolled at
German universities.15
Bergen and others also question the accuracy of certain popular situational explanations
of radicalization. The researchers cite Faisal Shahzad and Umar Farouq Abdulmuttalab as

12

Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, 69-80, 91-96.
Bakker, Jihadi Terrorists in Europe, 45-49.
14
Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman, Homegrown Terrorists in the U.S. and U.K, 56-57.
15
Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Radicalization: A Guide for the Perplexed (National Security Criminal
Investigations, June 2009), 5, http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/pubs/nsci-ecrsn/radical-eng.pdf (accessed October 22,
2011).
13
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examples of terrorists who do not fit any particular economic, educational, or social profile.
Shahzad had a degree in computing, an MBA, a job, and a wife and two children.
Abdulmuttalab, the son of a wealthy Nigerian banker, had a degree in engineering from
University College, London—one of Britain’s best universities.16 Bergen and others also take
exception to the idea that terrorists display a certain ethnic profile. To substantiate this claim, the
researchers examined the ethnicity of 57 Americans who were charged or convicted of Islamist
terrorist crimes between January 2009 and September 2010. Out of this group, 31 percent were
Somali-Americans, 21 percent Caucasian-Americans, 18 percent Arab-Americans, 14 percent
South Asian-Americans, 9 percent African-Americans, 4 percent Hispanic-Americans, and 2
percent Caribbean-Americans.17
2.2 Psychological Theories
Scholars have developed a plethora of psychological theories to explain terrorist
radicalization. While most of these theories are useful to some degree, like situational theories
of radicalization they remain highly controversial. Individual motivations for participating in
terrorism are so varied that it is a pointless endeavor to construct a psychological profile for all
would-be terrorists. Renowned terrorism expert Martha Crenshaw declared that “the outstanding
common characteristic of terrorists is their normality.”18 Jerrold Post, another expert in the field,
agreed with Crenshaw that terrorists exhibit no major psychopathology.19 An oft-cited NYPD
report concludes that “there is no useful profile to assist law enforcement or intelligence to
16

Peter Bergen, Bruce Hoffman, and Katherine Tiedemann, “Assessing the Jihadist Terrorist Threat to America
and American Interests,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 34, no. 2 (2011): 77, http://0www.tandfonline.com.lib.utep.edu/doi/full/10.1080/1057610X.2011.538830
17
Bergen, Hoffman, and Tiedemann, “Assessing the Jihadist Terrorist Threat,” 78.
18
Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” Comparative Politics 13, no. 4 (July 1981): 390, http://0www.jstor.org.lib.utep.edu/stable/421717 (accessed January 19, 2012).
19
Jerrold M. Post, “When Hatred is Bred in the Bone: Psycho-cultural Foundations of Contemporary
Terrorism,” Political Psychology 26, no. 4 (2005): 617, http://0-www.jstor.org.lib.utep.edu/stable/3792578
(accessed January 19, 2012).
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predict who will follow this trajectory of radicalization.” The report goes on to state that “the
individuals who take this course begin as ‘unremarkable’ from various walks of life.”20 Brian
Jenkins concurs with the statements of other experts that “there is no easily identifiable terroristprone personality.”21
Although the idea of a universal terrorist personality is nothing short of a myth,
radicalization is still fundamentally a psychological process. Individuals have to adjust their
thinking at some point to embrace Islamist doctrines and eventually pledge their allegiance to
terrorist organizations. Instead of categorizing terrorists according to personality, then, it makes
more sense to step back and look at the events that might prompt individuals to start down the
path to radicalization in the first place. Social identity theory can be highly useful when taking
this approach. According to social identity theory, individuals begin to investigate radical
Islamist ideologies after they experience a “cognitive opening.” Any number of events can spark
a cognitive opening, but usually these events are related to individuals’ social identity.
Quintan Wiktorowicz, in Radical Islam Rising, provided one of the most detailed
applications of social identity theory to date. Wiktorowicz used social identity theory as a
framework for studying al-Muhajiroun, a transnational Islamic movement based in the United
Kingdom. While not an Islamist movement in the vein of al-Qaeda, al-Muhajiroun nevertheless
supports “a number of violent causes and is considered part of the radical fringe of the Muslim
community.”22 Thus, al-Muhajiroun is close enough to a terrorist organization for the purposes
of this study.

20

Silber and Bhatt, Radicalization in the West, 8.
Brian Michael Jenkins, Would-Be Warriors: Incidents of Terrorist Radicalization in the United States since
September 11, 2001 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010), 7,
http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/RAND_OP292.pdf (accessed September 8, 2011).
22
Wiktorowicz, Radical Islam Rising, 5.
21
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Wiktorowicz’s central argument is that “individuals are initially inspired by a cognitive
opening that shakes certitude in previously accepted beliefs.”23 A cognitive opening gives
individuals the desire to expose themselves to new ways of thinking and makes them more
receptive to radical Islamist doctrines. Any number of crises can trigger a cognitive opening, so
it would be a futile exercise to attempt to compile a comprehensive list.24 However, the literature
on Islamic movements brings up several recurring themes, including the loss of a job, blocked
mobility, a sense of cultural weakness, racism, humiliation, political repression, torture, and
political discrimination. Wiktorowicz adds to that list a death in the family and victimization by
crime.25
In his study, Wiktorowicz found that racial and religious discrimination caused some
young Muslims to question their identity. University students, in particular, suffered from a
sense of blocked social mobility. The vast majority of these students were South Asians who
grew up in Britain, but were not considered British by mainstream society. They believed that a
discriminatory system prevented them from realizing their potential. Not surprisingly, these
university students became the dominant recruitment pool for al-Muhajiroun.26
Wiktorowicz is careful to note that personal crises are not the only trigger that can
generate cognitive openings. Activists can also prompt cognitive openings through their
outreach efforts. Naturally, activists target established social networks—family, friends, and
colleagues—for outreach. During the process of hanging out and socializing, activists attempt to

23

Ibid.
Ibid.
25
Ibid., 20.
26
Ibid., 90-91.
24
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“break down calcified preconceptions about the role of Islam so that individuals become
amenable to discussing the possibility of new interpretations.”27
A cognitive opening, whether prompted by a crisis or facilitated by a friend, does not
automatically lead to radicalization. Wiktorowicz makes it clear that not every individual who
experiences a cognitive opening will engage in religious seeking, and not every individual who
becomes a religious seeker will explore radical Islamic groups. Nevertheless, in many cases a
cognitive opening is enough to prompt and individual to explore radical Islamist groups.
According to Wiktorowicz, those religious seekers who end up exploring radical Islamic groups
are typically part of social networks that tie them to the group.28 (The author will discuss social
networking theory and social movement theory in the next section.)
As mentioned previously, any number of events can spark a cognitive opening. In
Wiktorowicz’s study, young South Asian Muslims in Britain experienced a cognitive opening as
a result of an identity crisis. The notion of an identity crisis prompting a cognitive opening is
actually quite common in the radicalization literature. After reviewing the current research
literature, Choudhury concluded that “the path to radicalization often involves a search for
identity at a moment of crisis.”29 Likewise, Jenkins, in his testimony before the House
Homeland Security Committee, stated that potential jihadist recruits in Western countries are
vulnerable when they “are at a stage of life where they are seeking an identity.”30

27

Ibid., 93.
Ibid., 5.
29
Tufyal Choudhury, The Role of Muslim Identity Politics in Radicalization: A Study in Progress (London:
Department for Communities and Local Government, April 2007), 21,
http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/communities/pdf/452628.pdf (accessed October 22, 2011).
30
Brian Michael Jenkins, Building and Army of Believers: Jihadist Radicalization and Recruitment (Santa
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, April 2007), 3,
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/2007/RAND_CT278-1.pdf (accessed October 22, 2011).
28
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As Wiktorowicz’s study demonstrates, social identity theory is often used to explain
radicalization within immigrant communities. Oliver Roy delivers a masterful explanation of
social identity theory as it relates to immigrant communities in his landmark work titled
Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah. According to Roy, the nature of religiosity—
how believers experience and formulate their relationship to religion—changes when Muslims
immigrate to Western countries. Muslim immigrants living in the West find that religious
practice has to be elaborated upon because it is no longer embedded in culture and society. In
the absence of legitimate religious authorities to define the norms of Islam, immigrants must
reformulate their religious identity on their own.31 Roy argues that immigrants typically
construct a “deculturalized” Islamic identity, or an Islamic identity that is not linked to any given
culture.32 Unfortunately, immigrants who select a deculturalized version of Islam as their
identity are vulnerable to neofundamentalism, an ideology which itself rejects culture and seeks
to rebuild the Muslim ummah on a purely religious basis.33
Stroink also employs social identity theory to examine radicalization among Muslim
immigrant communities. According to Stroink, second-generation immigrants identify culturally
with one of three groups: the ingroup, the outgroup, or the transitional outgroup. The path to
radicalization varies depending on the group with which the individual identifies.
Second-generation immigrants who identify with the ingroup embrace mainstream
culture. Although it is hard to imagine these individuals engaging in terrorism, there are
instances when such is the case. For example, second-generation immigrants may consider

31

Oliver Roy, Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004),
149-152.
32
Ibid., 23.
33
Ibid., 258.
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themselves to be members of the mainstream culture, but still perceive this culture be flawed in
certain ways. In their attempts to change the culture they may resort to violent means.
Second-generation immigrants who identify with the outgroup never embrace the
mainstream culture. Despite growing up surrounded by mainstream culture, these individuals
reach late adolescence without ever considering themselves a part of it—either they identify with
the heritage culture or they do not identify with any culture at all. Individuals who do not
identify with any cultural group are particularly vulnerable to radicalization because they are
searching for somewhere to belong.34
Finally, there are second-generation immigrants who at one time identify with the
mainstream culture, but later reject it as they escalate toward violence. Individuals in this group
manage to turn an ingroup into a hated outgroup. Stroink goes on to outline three theories that
might explain radicalization among second-generation immigrants with transitional outgroup
identification: Phinney’s three-stage model of ethnic identity development, optimal
distinctiveness theory, and ingroup exclusion theory.35
2.3 Social Theories
Unlike situational and psychological theories of radicalization, social theories of
radicalization are not that controversial. Sageman’s social networking theory, as introduced in
Understanding Terror Networks, is the most important social theory for the purposes of this
study. After extensively examining two terrorist cells—the plotters of the unsuccessful
millennial bombing of the Los Angeles airport and the Hamburg cell responsible for the 9/11
attacks—Sageman concluded that “the formation of a network of friendships . . . solidified and
34
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preceded formal introduction into the terrorist organization.”36 Sageman found that friendship
bonds played a role in the formal affiliation of 68 percent of his sample, and that kinship bonds
played a role in the formal affiliation of 14 percent. After he combined the statistics for
friendship and kinship and eliminated the overlap, Sageman found that “about 75 percent of the
mujahedin had preexisting social bonds to members already involved in the global jihad or
decided to join the jihad as a group with friends or relatives.”37
Sageman published a follow-up book to Understanding Terror Networks, titled
Leaderless Jihad, in 2008. In Leaderless Jihad, Sageman identified two major radicalization
pathways for the individuals in his sample. The first pathway involved a “bunch of guys” who
collectively decided to join a terrorist organization. The second pathway involved individuals
who decided to join childhood friends. When these individuals emigrated to the West they
looked up their former friends, and, if these friends were part of a terrorist group, the individuals
ended up joining that group.38 In both Leaderless Jihad and Understanding Terror Networks,
Sageman makes a persuasive argument for the importance of friendship and kinship bonds in the
radicalization process.
In the section detailing psychological theories of radicalization, the author pointed out
that individuals need to experience some sort of cognitive opening to consider adopting radical
terrorist ideologies, and that this cognitive opening is often preceded by an identity crisis. While
cognitive openings can prepare individuals to embrace Islamist ideologies, by themselves they
are not enough. A 2007 study conducted by the NYPD states that, while individuals generally
36
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begin the radicalization process on their own, as they progress through the stages of
radicalization they invariably seek out like-minded individuals and form groups and clusters.39
The results of Sageman’s study gel with the findings of the NYPD study; to wit, that
potential jihadists need like-minded associates to progress to the next level of violent
radicalization. As Sageman puts it, “Only other people . . . who are further along the path to
violence or who are willing to explore it with them, can help them cross the line from venting
their anger to becoming terrorists.” The global Islamist terrorists in Sageman’s study began their
journey in informal groups. Sageman explains how these informal groups experienced
simultaneously a process of in-group love and out-group hate. On the one hand, the group acted
as a support mechanism, encouraging members to sacrifice for the cause. On the other hand, the
group acted as an “echo chamber,” encouraging members to escalate their grievances to the point
of hatred. In the end, a “natural and intense loyalty to the group . . . transformed alienated young
Muslims into fanatic terrorists.40
Social movement theory essentially operates on the same premise as social networking
theory, namely, that informal group ties play an important role in the process of mobilization.
Neumann and Rogers used social movement theory as a framework for looking at recruitment to
the militant Islamist movement in Europe. They found that, “in the vast majority of cases, the
transition to violence takes place within the confines of tightly-knit groups, and that the social
forces which unfold here have a strong influence on their judgment and behavior.”41
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In Radical Islam Rising, Quintan Wiktorowicz meticulously applied social movement
theory to radicalization, using al-Muhajiroun as a case study. As mentioned previously, alMuhajiroun is a transnational Islamic movement based in the United Kingdom. After conducting
extensive research, Wiktorowicz found that individuals, even if they were predisposed to alMuhajiroun and its message, rarely attended activities unless they knew someone in the
movement.42 In line with social movement theory, al-Muhajiroun activists turned to their
established social networks when attempting to persuade others to join the movement because
these networks gave activists an atmosphere of trust in which to discuss controversial topics.
Activists discussed religious and political issues with their friends, hoping to convince them that
these issues were important and that Muslims needed to do something about them. Wiktorowicz
believes that individuals in the network, because they were friends, felt a certain social pressure
to take a stand on the issues and to be “real” Muslims.43
Social networking and social movement theory both state that individuals need social
interaction with other like-minded individuals to make the leap to violent radicalization. In the
past such fraternizing might have taken place in person, but today much of it takes place online
via social media. A joint report by the Homeland Security Policy Institute and the Critical
Incident Analysis Group, titled “NETworked Radicalization: A Counter Strategy,” argues that
the Internet is a potent recruiting tool because it “brings together people—friends, family
members, or complete strangers—with similar interests and values and fosters a sense of
affiliation and identity.”44 The International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political
Violence echoes these sentiments in a report titled “Countering Online Radicalisation.” The
42
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report states that the Internet “has made it easier to find people and create networks among likeminded individuals, across great distances and beyond national borders.”45 In the digital age, the
Internet, due to its convenience and unlimited reach, seems to be replacing traditional social
forums like mosques. That trend is likely to continue.
Sageman devotes an entire chapter of Leaderless Jihad to examining the role of the
Internet in mobilizing terrorists. After reviewing global Islamist terrorist networks, Sageman
discovers a clear shift in the modes of interaction starting around 2004. Around that time
terrorists began to rely less on face-to-face interaction and more on online interaction.46
Sageman makes an important distinction between the Internet’s two major systems, a distinction
that will be important for this study. The first system is the World Wide Web, which is a
collection of all websites. People access websites to find information, but websites are passive,
meaning they do not provide a means of social interaction. Sageman claims that passive
websites are not the engine of radicalization because “people in general do not change their
minds or harden their views by reading newspaper articles or books.” The Internet’s second
system is an active system of communication between individuals and groups. It includes email, listservs, forums, and chat rooms. According to Sageman, this second system is the real
engine of radicalization; the “bunch of guys” phenomenon that once took place offline is now
taking place online through this system.47
Although the Internet is increasingly playing a larger role in the process of radicalization,
it has yet to play a dominant role. Self-radicalization on the Internet with no face-to-face
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interaction is a rare phenomenon indeed.48 Sageman admits that “the Internet can help bridge the
gap from the isolated potential mujahed to the global mujahed,” but adds that the Internet is not
persuasive enough by itself.49 In fact, none of the mujahed in Sageman’s sample went straight
from interacting on the Internet to joining the global Salafi jihad. Although the Internet can
familiarize an individual with the global Salafi ideology, the Internet cannot prove the
individuals commitment to the cause. The individual needs a period of intensive face-to-face
interaction in which to demonstrate loyalty.50
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3. RESEARCH DESIGN
This thesis is a case study that examines radicalization empirically using data from open
source literature. The variables chosen for measuring radicalization in this study are essentially
that same as the variables chosen by Sageman and Bakker for measuring radicalization in their
respective studies. These variables fall into one of three categories: situational, psychological, or
social (see table 3.1).
Table 3.1: Variables used in Previous Studies Versus Current Study

Variable category
Situational

Psychological

Social

Previous studies
Geographic origin
Place of recruitment
Age
Level of education
Occupation
Employment status
Family status
Criminal record
Faith as youth
Socioeconomic status
Relative deprivation
Religious devotion
Mental illness
Terrorist personality
Other
Friendship
Other
Kinship
Worship
Discipleship

Current study
Ethnicity
Place of recruitment
Average departure age
Level of education
Occupation
Employment status
Family status
Criminal record
Religious background
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Cognitive opening
Ideology
Self-radicalized
Group-radicalized
Internet-radicalized
Relative-radicalized
Mosque-radicalized
N/A

Most of the variables chosen for this study are straightforward. However, each variable deserves
a thorough explanation to avoid any confusion in measurement or interpretation.
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3.1 Situational Variables
In previous studies “geographic origin” referred to country of origin. In this study, since
the entire sample comes from the United States, “ethnicity”—specifically whether or not a
recruit is Somali-American—will be used in the place of “geographic origin.” In previous
studies “place of recruitment” referred to the country in which an individual was recruited.
However, in this study “place of recruitment” refers to whether or not an individual was recruited
within an immigrant community. “Age” in this study refers specifically to the age at which
recruits departed for Somalia.
The variable “level of education” is simple—recruits are categorized as high school
dropouts, high school graduates, college dropouts, or college graduates. “Occupation” in this
study has the exact same meaning as it does in previous studies; recruits are categorized as
unskilled, semiskilled, or skilled laborers. As in previous studies, “employment status” in this
study refers to whether or not individuals are employed. “Family status” also has the same
meaning in this study; recruits are categorized as single, married, or divorced. “Criminal record”
needs no explanation—recruits either have a criminal record or they do not. Finally, previous
studies measured “faith as a youth” by categorizing individuals as either religious or secular.
This study measures “faith as a youth” by categorizing recruits as either converts or nonconverts.
Certain variables used in previous studies are not used in this study. For example, this
study does not measure “socioeconomic status” simply because data on household incomes are
not available. This study does not measure “relative deprivation” simply because its
measurement is largely subjective. Finally, this study does not measure “religious devotion” per
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se, although certain aspects of religious devotion are taken into account later when looking at
another variable, “ideology.”
3.2 Psychological Variables
Insufficient data exist to measure the psychological variables “mental illness” and
“terrorist personalities.” In any case, experts are of a consensus that terrorists do not suffer from
mental illnesses and that there is no such thing as a terrorist personality. However, this study
will measure other psychological variables. Specifically, this study looks at whether recruits
experience a cognitive opening (see literature review), and also at recruits’ ideology. “Ideology”
in this study refers specifically to whether recruits espouse nationalist sentiments, Salafist
sentiments, or both.
3.3 Social Variables
All of the social variables used in this study are clear-cut. Individuals who are “selfradicalized” go through the radicalization process alone. Recruits who are “group-radicalized”
interact with one or more like-minded individuals during the radicalization process. Recruits
who are “relative-radicalized” go through the process together with a family member. Recruits
who are “Internet-radicalized” are influenced heavily by propaganda and fellow jihadists online.
Finally, recruits who are “mosque-radicalized” spend significant time at mosques where they
meet other recruits. (The variable “discipleship” is not applicable to this study.)
As described above, each of the variables in this study can be broken down into two or
more categories. The categories for each variable are listed in table 3.2.
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Table 3.2: Variable Categories

Variable
Ethnicity
Place of recruitment
Average departure age
Level of education
Occupation
Employment status
Family status
Criminal record
Religious background
Cognitive opening
Ideology
Self-radicalized
Group-radicalized
Internet-radicalized
Relative-radicalized
Mosque-radicalized

Categories
Somali, non-Somali
Immigrant community, non-immigrant community
N/A
Some high school, high school graduate, some college, college
graduate
Unskilled, semiskilled, skilled
Unemployed, employed
Single, married, divorced
Y/N
Convert, non-convert
Y/N
Nationalist, Salafist, both
Y/N
Y/N
Y/N
Y/N
Y/N

To facilitate data collection on each of the variable categories listed in table 2, the author came
up with specific key indicators. Key indicators are signs or clues that help researchers place data
within a certain variable category. Table 3.3 lists key indicators for each variable category.
(Key indicators are not listed for variables that are self-explanatory.)
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Table 3.3: Key Indicators

Variable
Cognitive opening

Category
Yes

Ideology

Nationalist

Salafist

Group-radicalized

Yes

Internet-radicalized

Yes

Relative-radicalized

Yes

Key Indicator
Identity conflict
Job loss
Death of a loved one
Victimization by crime
Blocked mobility
Racism, discrimination
Political repression
Grievance
Motivated by al-Shabaab propaganda
Motivated by Ethiopian invasion of Somalia
Communicates with al-Shabaab
Motivated by al-Qaeda propaganda
Communicates with al-Qaeda
Supports Salafism verbally/in writing
Interprets Quran literally
Supports implementation of sharia law
Excessively devout/pious
Calls other extremists
Meets with other extremists
Travels to Somalia with other extremists
Reads extremist propaganda online
Listens to extremist propaganda online
Watches extremist propaganda online
E-mails/chats with other extremists
Participates in extremist blogs/forums
Calls an extremist relative
Meets with an extremist relative
Travels to Somali with an extremist relative

With the key indicators in mind, the author carefully examined local news stories, legal
proceedings, and congressional hearings to find pertinent snippets of information.51 After
examining all the available information on individual al-Shabaab recruits, the author analyzed
the data to determine if there were, in fact, two different radicalization processes taking place—
one for Somalis and one for non-Somalis. The author then modeled these radicalization
processes using causal flow diagrams and feedback loops. In the following section, the author
51
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will explain how exactly causal flow diagrams and feedback loops work, and how they were
applied to this study.
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4. METHODOLOGY
After reviewing the available data, the author came up with a list of 41 al-Shabaab
recruits from the United States (see appendix). Recruits are defined as individuals who either
traveled to Somalia to join al-Shabaab or attempted to do so. Many Americans have been
indicted for providing material support to al-Shabaab, but if they did not travel or attempt to
travel to Somalia they are not included in this sample. The first al-Shabaab recruit traveled to
Somali in 2005, and the last al-Shabaab recruit traveled to Somalia in 2011.
The methodology for this study initially mimics the methodology employed by Sageman
and Bakker in their respective studies. First, the author compiled sources containing
biographical data on each individual recruit. Second, the author scanned the biographical data
for the key indicators listed in table 3. Third, the author recorded relevant pieces of data in a
spreadsheet containing the names of all the recruits and the variables listed in table 2. Fourth,
the author percentaged the data in the spreadsheet to determine which variables were good
predictors of al-Shabaab radicalization in the United States and which variables were not.
Sageman and Bakker terminate their analyses at this point. This study, however, carries
radicalization analysis one step further by dividing the recruits into two groups—non-Somalis
and Somalis—and looking at each group separately. The reason for dividing the sample is
simple: non-Somalis probably join al-Shabaab for different reasons than their Somali
counterparts. Considering al-Shabaab is both a localized, ethno-nationalist insurgency and an
international, religious terrorist organization, this makes sense. Based on the results of previous
radicalization studies, as well as studies on the Somali diaspora in the United States, the author
hypothesizes that the radicalization process for non-Somalis will be significantly different than
the radicalization process for Somalis (see table 4.1).
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Table 4.1: Hypothesis

Variable
Place of recruitment
Departure date
Average departure age
Level of education
Occupation
Employment status
Family status
Criminal record
Religious background
Cognitive opening
Ideology
Self-radicalized
Group-radicalized
Internet-radicalized
Relative-radicalized
Mosque-radicalized

Non-Somalis
Non-immigrant community
?
Mid-20s
?
?
?
?
?
?
Yes
Salafist
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

Somalis
Immigrant community
After December 2006
Mid-20s
Some high school, high school graduate
Unskilled, semiskilled
Unemployed
?
Yes
Non-convert
Yes
Nationalist
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Even though the author hypothesizes that each group will undergo a unique radicalization
process, these processes can still converge at various points. All of the recruits, for example,
probably left for Somali in their mid-20s, if results of the studies conducted by Sageman and
Bakker are any indication of average departure age.52 Similarly, a majority of the recruits were
probably radicalized in groups, in line with social networking and social movement theory.
Even though certain areas of overlap are possible, the author nevertheless hypothesizes
that, for the most part, the non-Somali recruits followed their own unique radicalization pathway.
For instance, the non-Somali recruits were most likely recruited in non-immigrant communities,
although it is possible that some came from immigrant communities. In terms of departure date,
the author does not assume any particular pattern. Also, because of the controversial nature of
the results of previous studies regarding level of education, occupation, employment status,
family status, criminal record, and religious background, the author does not make any
52
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hypotheses for these variables. However, the author does hypothesize that a majority of the nonSomali recruits, since they had no ethnic ties to Somalia, were motivated by Salafism as opposed
to nationalism.
Hypotheses about the Somali recruits are slightly easier to make because of the amount of
research that has been done on the Somali immigrant community in the United States. Somalis
in general experienced a renewed nationalist fervor after Ethiopian invasion of December 2006.
Therefore, the author hypothesizes that a majority of the Somali recruits decided to join alShabaab after December 2006. Research reveals that the Somali immigrant community in the
United States struggles with high poverty rates, high unemployment rates, high crime rates, and
low rates of college graduation.53 Therefore, the author hypothesizes that the Somali individuals
in this study struggled with those same issues. Obviously, since the Somali recruits are the
children of first-generation immigrants, the majority are presumably Muslim still, although they
may not practice their religion.
If, in fact, there are two different radicalization processes—one for non-Somalis and one
for Somalis—it should be possible to model both of these processes with causal flow diagrams.
Causal flow diagramming represents yet another deviation from previous radicalizations studies
that merely look at variables in isolation. For data collection purposes, it will be useful to break
the radicalization process down into discrete parts. However, at some point the most important
parts of the radicalization process will need to be reassembled to form a complete picture. Few
radicalization studies, if any, have employed causal flow diagramming as an analytic technique,
yet causal flow diagramming is an excellent technique for visualizing complex processes and for
53
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understanding how variables are related to each other. In this particular study, causal flow
diagramming will help the author visualize the likely sequence of events leading to radicalization
for each group of al-Shabaab recruits.
Former CIA analyst Morgan D. Jones outlines five steps for defining and analyzing a
problem’s cause-and-effect system: 1) identify major factors, 2) identify cause-and-effect
relationships, 3) characterize the relationships as direct or inverse, 4) diagram the relationships,
and 5) analyze the behavior of the relationships as an integrated system. The first step,
identifying major factors, is nothing more than highlighting the variables with the most
explanatory power. The second step is to identify the cause-and-effect linkages among the
factors. Jones suggests using a two-column “Cause-and-Effect Table,” with the causal factors in
the right-hand column and the affected factors in the left-hand column (see table 4.2).
Table 4.2: Causal and Affected Factors

Causal Factor
Sales
Profits
R&D capability
Marketing of new products
Competitors’ marketing of new products







Affected Factor
Profits
R&D capability
Marketing of new products
Competitors’ marketing of new products
Sales

The third step is to characterize these cause-and-effect relationships as direct or inverse. If the
affected factor increases as the causal factor increases, the relationship is direct. If the affected
factor increases as the causal factor decreases, the relationship is inverse. Jones uses a “D” for
direct relationships and an “I” for indirect relationships (see table 4.3).
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Table 4.3: Direct or Inverse Relationship

Causal Factor
Sales
Profits
R&D capability
Marketing of new products
Competitors’ marketing of new products

D
D
D
D
I

Affected Factor
Profits
R&D capability
Marketing of new products
Competitors’ marketing of new products
Sales

Once relationships are characterized as direct or inverse, a causal flow diagram can be drawn
(see figure 4.1).

Sales

D

Profits

D

R&D
capability

D

Marketing of
new products

D

Competitors'
marketing of
new products

Figure 4.1: Causal Flow Diagram

Jones states that the most powerful driving force in any cause-and-effect scheme is the feedback
loops in which two or more factors are linked circularly. If all of the linkages are direct
relationships, or if there is an even number of inverse linkages, the loop is inherently unstable
(see figure 4.2).

Sales

Marketing
of new
products

Profits

R&D
capability

Figure 4.2: Unstable Feedback Loop

If there in an odd number of inverse linkages, the loop is inherently stable (see figure 4.3).
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Figure 4.3: Stable Feedback Loop

The fifth step is to analyze the behavior of the system as an integrated whole, determining which
factors are the most influential and validating that cause-and-effect relationships are portrayed
accurately.54
Few radicalization studies, if any, have employed causal flow diagramming as an analytic
technique. However, some studies in the broader social science realm have employed causal
loop diagramming, a closely associated analytic technique commonly used in the field of system
dynamics (SD). SD is a way to model and depict factors contributing to the behavior of a system
and the causal relationships that exist among these factors. To employ SD, the first step is to
create a causal loop diagram that shows these factors and their causal linkages. Ezell and others
demonstrate how causal loop diagramming works by using it to model behavioral change in an
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insurgent population.55 Gil and others briefly use causal loop diagramming to explore the effects
of policies aimed at reducing acts of terrorism against the U.S. in the Middle East. 56
Causal flow diagramming is essentially the same as causal loop diagramming; the major
difference is that causal flow diagramming is simpler to perform because it does not require
sophisticated SD software. The reason for employing causal flow diagramming in this study is
to help the reader visualize the radicalization process, not to overwhelm the reader with complex
computer-generated graphics. Two modest causal flow diagrams—one for each group of alShabaab recruits—should be sufficient to visualize each group’s radicalization process. Once
the causal flow diagrams are in place, the author will attempt to identify any feedback loops, if
they exist.
Data for this study comes from several sources. Much of the data on al-Shabaab
recruiting comes from non-profit think tanks. Important U.S. think tanks include the American
Enterprise Institute, the Anti-Defamation League, the Center for Strategic and International
Studies, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Foreign Policy Research Institute, the Foundation
for Defense of Democracies, the Investigative Project on Terrorism, the Jamestown Foundation,
and the RAND Corporation. Important overseas think tanks include the Australian Strategic
Policy Institute, the Institute for Security Studies, the International Centre for the Study of
Radicalization, and the Netherlands Institute of International Relations.
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Several academic institutions publish valuable information on al-Shabaab recruiting,
including the George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute, the West Point
Combating Terrorism Center, the University of North Carolina Triangle Center on Terrorism and
Homeland Security, and the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute. A few theses
written by Naval Postgraduate School students also offer valuable information on al-Shabaab
recruits. Open source intelligence for this study comes exclusively from STRATFOR.
Local news outlets provide first-rate biographical information on individual recruits.
Most of the information on the Minnesota recruits comes from Minnesota Public Radio News
and TwinCities.com, while most of the information on the Washington recruits comes from the
Seattle Times. Some of the most authoritative sources of information on al-Shabaab recruits are
congressional hearings. Thus far the House Committee on Homeland Security has convened two
separate hearings on al-Shabaab recruitment in the United States. The first hearing, titled Violent
Islamist Extremism: Al-Shabaab Recruitment in America, took place in March 2009. The second
hearing, titled Al Shabaab: Recruitment and Radicalization within the Muslim American
Community and the Threat to the Homeland, took place in July 2011.
Without a doubt, the most detailed and nuanced sources of biographical information on
recruits are official legal proceedings. The NEFA Foundation is an excellent resource for
obtaining original legal documents relating to terrorist activities. U.S. district court documents—
including criminal complaints, affidavits and indictments—describe recruit’s offenses in
exquisite detail. These documents are absolutely essential to form a complete picture of a
recruit’s background, thought process, and social network.
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5. RESULTS
After examining local news articles and court documents for the key indicators listed in
table 3, the author recorded biographical information on each individual recruit for the variables
listed in table 2. Next, the author calculated percentages for each variable to uncover any
patterns that might exist (see table 5.1).
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Table 5.1: Percentages

Variable
Place of recruitment
Departure date
Average departure age
Level of education

Occupation

Employment status
Family status

Criminal record
Religious background
Cognitive opening
Ideology

Self-radicalized
Group-radicalized
Internet-radicalized
Relative-radicalized
Mosque-radicalized

Categories
Immigrant community
Non-immigrant community
Before December 2006
After December 2006
N/A
Some high school
High school graduate
Some college
College graduate
Unskilled
Semiskilled
Skilled
Unemployed
Employed
Single
Married
Divorced
Yes
No
Convert
Non-convert
Yes
No
Nationalist
Salafist
Both
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
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Total sample
(n=41)
76%
24%
13%
87%
23
24%
28%
44%
4%
30%
61%
9%
25%
75%
53%
40%
7%
18%
82%
21%
79%
100%
0%
54%
38%
8%
5%
95%
95%
5%
100%
0%
3%
97%
46%
54%

Non-Somalis
(n=11)
18%
82%
45%
55%
24
12.5%
37.5%
37.5%
12.5%
38%
63%
0%
40%
60%
50%
50%
0%
27%
73%
89%
11%
100%
0%
0%
100%
0%
18%
82%
82%
18%
100%
0%
10%
90%
11%
89%

Somalis
(n=30)
100%
0%
0%
100%
23.5
29%
24%
47%
0%
25%
50%
17%
14%
86%
60%
20%
20%
15%
85%
0%
100%
100%
0%
82%
6%
12%
0%
100%
100%
0%
100%
0%
0%
100%
65%
35%

5.1 Situational Variables
5.1.1 Ethnicity and Place of Recruitment
Of the 41 recruits, 11 (23 percent) were non-Somali and 30 (73 percent) were Somali.
Seventy-six percent of the recruits came from immigrant communities: Minneapolis, Minnesota;
Columbus, Ohio; and Seattle, Washington. The rest of the sample came from disparate parts of
the United States, including Alabama, California, Illinois, Maryland, New Jersey, Texas, and
Virginia.
The non-Somali recruits were extremely ethnically diverse; they included four
Caucasians, three Arabs, two Latinos, an Arab-Caucasian, and an African-American-Latino. All
of the non-Somali recruits came from different places, with the exception of Mohamed Alessa
and Carlos Almonte, who were radicalized together in New Jersey. Troy Kastigar was the only
non-Somali recruit to be radicalized within a Somali immigrant community and travel to Somalia
with a group of Somali recruits.
Almost all of the Somali recruits came from Minneapolis, Minnesota. Three, however,
came from Columbus, Ohio and one came from Seattle, Washington. These cities represent the
largest Somali immigrant communities in the United States. Sources indicate that all of the
recruits from Minneapolis, Minnesota knew each other to some degree.
5.1.2 Departure Date and Age
Out of all the recruits, only 13 percent left for Somali before December 2006, compared
to 87 percent that left after December 2006. These percentages make sense, considering alShabaab only gained prominence internationally after the Ethiopian invasion of December 2006.
The average departure age of the recruits was 23.
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Of the non-Somali recruits, five left before December 2006 and six left after December
2006. Most of these recruits traveled to Somalia alone, with the exception of Omar Hammami
and Daniel Maldonado, who traveled to Somalia together from Egypt, and Mohamed Alessa and
Carlos Almonte, who attempted to travel to Somalia together from New Jersey. The average
departure age of the non-Somali recruits was 24.
All of the Somali recruits traveled to Somalia after December 2006. Based on their
departure dates, the Somali recruits appear to have traveled to Somali in four separate waves.
The first wave57 left around December 2007, the second wave58 left around November 2008, the
third wave59 left around October 2009, and the fourth wave60 left around June 2011. The average
departure age of the Somali recruits was 23.5.
5.1.3 Level of Education
Results show that 52 percent of the total sample had a high school education or less, and
that 48 percent of the total sample had at least some college education. Overall, this sample is
much less educated than the sample in Sageman’s study. Sageman found that 29 percent of his
sample had a high school education or less, and that 71 percent had at least some college
education.61 Whereas 42 percent of Sageman’s sample graduated from college, only one recruit
in this sample, Jehad Mostafa, graduated from college.
Of the non-Somali recruits, 50 percent had a high school education or less and 50 percent
had at least some college education. Many of the non-Somali recruits who attended college
dropped out as they became more radical. Omar Hammami, for example, dropped out of the
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University of Southern Alabama in December 2002, saying that he could no longer bear to be in
the company of women.62 Likewise, Zachary Chesser dropped out of George Mason University
as a freshman to pursue his mission of propagating Salafism full-time.63
Of the Somali recruits, 53 percent had a high school education or less and 47 percent had
at least some college education. Interestingly, the Somali recruits attained approximately the
same level of education as their non-Somali counterparts. It is actually quite remarkable that so
many second-generation immigrants attended college. Sources indicate that many of the recruits
were intelligent and academically motivated. Abdifatah Isse’s counselor at Roosevelt High
School described him as “very sharp, very verbal. He just had a spark about him.”64 Burhan
Hassan was an “A” student at Roosevelt High School who planned on becoming a doctor or a
lawyer.65 Abdisalan Ali was an ambitious pre-med student at the University of Minnesota who
hoped for an internship at the Mayo Clinic.66 His former mentor described him as “a highly
motivated kid” who “wanted to change lives.”67 Although many of the Somali recruits excelled
in school, many of them also dropped out. Shirwa Ahmed, for example, struggled at community
colleges before dropping out.68 Abdinassir Osman also quit school early.69
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5.1.4 Occupation and Employment Status
Out of all the recruits in the sample, 30 percent had unskilled occupations, 61 percent had
semiskilled occupations, and 9 percent had skilled occupations. Seventy-five percent of the
recruits were employed, and 25 percent were not. Many of the recruits went through several jobs
before finally departing for Somalia to join al-Shabaab.
Of the non-Somali recruits, 38 percent had unskilled occupations. Troy Kastigar, for
example, earned money giving haircuts and selling shoes.70 Carlos Almonte worked for two
years at the cash register of a New Jersey computer shop before quitting. A supervisor later
informed journalists that Almonte was “not smart” and complained that “the simplest thing he
could not do.”71 Sixty-three percent of non-Somali recruits had semiskilled occupations. Some
were students, one was a computer technician, and another was a soldier in the U.S. Army. Not
a single non-Somali recruit had a skilled occupation.
Of the Somali recruits, 25 percent had unskilled occupations. Shirwa Ahmed, for
example, worked at the airport pushing passengers in wheel chairs and also delivered packages
for a medical supplies company, driving a beat-up Toyota. Kamal Hassan worked as a waiter at
his family’s restaurant, Zakaria Maruf worked in the stock room of a Walmart, and Jamal Bana
worked at Macy’s.72 Fifty percent of the Somali recruits had semiskilled occupations; most of
these recruits were students with part-time jobs. Somewhat surprisingly, two of the recruits had
skilled jobs: Ahmed Omar was an emergency medical technician for an ambulance service, and
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Abdisalan Ali was a caseworker at the law firm Briggs & Morgan. Again, somewhat
surprisingly, 86 percent of the Somali recruits were employed. The Somali recruits who were
not employed were either very young still (e.g., Burhan Hassan) or had criminal records that
prevented them from obtaining employment (e.g., Farah Beledi).73
5.1.5 Family Status
Out of all the recruits, 53 percent were single, 40 percent were married, and 7 percent
were divorced. It should be noted that these percentages for family status are probably
inaccurate due to insufficient data. The author could only find data on family status for 15 of the
recruits, most of whom were non-Somalis. If additional data on the family status of the Somali
recruits were available, the percentage of recruits who were single would likely increase
dramatically.
Data on the family status of the non-Somali recruits is abundant. Results show that 50
percent of the non-Somali recruits were married. Most of these recruits married after converting
to Islam. Omar Hammami, for example, was “desperate” to marry after converting to Islam, and
therefore, in pursuit of his goal, moved to Toronto where he promptly found a Somali wife.74
Zachary Chesser met his wife, a fellow convert and the daughter of a Ugandan diplomat, on
Anwar al-Awlaki’s now defunct blog.75 Ruben Shumpert also married after converting to
Islam.76 Troy Kastigar married after traveling to Somalia.77
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Despite a lack of data, it is safe to assume that most of the Somali recruits were single at
the time of recruitment, with the exception of Kamal Hassan and Mahamud Omar. However,
some of the Somali recruits who started out single got married once they traveled to Somalia.
Cabdulaahi Faarax, for example, told his friends that after he was done fighting in Somalia he
traveled to Nairobi, Kenya and got married to two women.78 Zakaria Maruf likewise boasted to
his friends in conference calls that he had gotten married and had a child.79
Although this study looks specifically at family status in terms of marital status, the
definition of family status might be expanded to include whether or not a recruit comes from a
single parent household. Researchers routinely portray Somali immigrant families as single
parent households. In his testimony before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs Committee, Abdirahman Mukhtar stated that “Somali families tend to be large, mostly
with single parents who are working to make ends meet.”80 According to an article by NPR,
“All of [the recruits] were reared by single mothers.81 NPR’s reporting is probably an
exaggeration, but no doubt many of the recruits were reared by single mothers. This had
important implications for recruiting. Community informants suspect that the recruits were
manipulated by charismatic male recruiters—men who spoke to the recruits with authority and
acted as father figures.82
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5.1.6 Criminal Record
Only 18 percent of the overall sample, two non-Somalis (Ruben Shumpert and Carlos
Almonte) and four Somalis (Abdifatah Isse, Zakaria Maruf, Farah Beledi, and Abdinassir
Osman), had a criminal record.
Ruben Shumpert, in a letter to U.S. District Judge Marsha Pechman, admitted that “my
life has been peppered with substance abuse, crime, and hardships so severe it would have
completely destroyed most people.”83 Al-Shabaab released a statement on Shumpert in October
2008, part of which detailed his criminal activities. According to the statement, Shumpert “grew
up in the company of narcotics rings in the state [of Washington] until he became one of the
biggest drug traffickers [in the region].”84 Carlos Almonte also had a criminal record. He was
arrested for assault (twice), possession of a knife on school property, and underage drinking.85
Troy Kastigar committed several misdemeanors, ranging from credit card fraud to driving after
his license was revoked, before he left for Somalia.86
At least four of the Somali recruits had criminal records. Zakaria Maruf was arrested for
trying to steal a $15.99 necklace at a mall and later fell in with the Hot Boyz, a violent street
gang.87 According to municipal court records, Abdifatah Isse was charged with being a minor in
possession of drugs and alcohol and with issuing bad checks.88 Farah Beledi was perhaps the
most violent of the Somali offenders. In 2007, Beledi pleaded guilty to stabbing a man in the
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neck and his side during a soccer game at Central High School in St. Paul. He served more than
a year in prison, and was on supervised release until May 2009.89
5.1.7 Religious Background
Of the total sample, 21 percent of the recruits were converts to Islam. Not surprisingly,
all of the converts were non-Somalis. Each of these recruits converted to Islam for different
reasons. Omar Hammami grew up in a mixed-religion household—his mother took him to
Perdido Baptist Church on Sundays and his father urged him to study Islam. Hammami did not
know whether to be Christian or Muslim until he traveled to Damascus to visit his extended
family. In Damascus, Hammami was impressed by the “cohesiveness of brotherhood” his male
cousins shared and started to incline toward Islam.90 Another recruit, Zachary Chesser,
converted to Islam while playing on a soccer team organized by a member of the Islamic
proselytizing group Hizb al-Tahrir.91 Ruben Shumpert was the only recruit to convert to Islam
while in prison.92
5.2 Psychological Variables
5.2.1 Cognitive Opening
As mentioned in the literature review, during the radicalization process individuals
typically experience a cognitive opening that makes them amenable to radical ideologies. All of
the recruits in this sample experienced a cognitive opening. Although identity conflict often
triggers a cognitive opening, other phenomena can also act as triggers. Scholars typically cite
discrimination and blocked mobility as important triggers.93 Most of the recruits in this sample
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seemed to be affected by discrimination and blocked mobility to some degree. However, only
the Somali recruits seemed to experience an identity conflict. Political grievances contributed to
a cognitive opening for both groups of recruits. On the one hand, U.S. foreign policy seemed to
be a strong trigger for the non-Somali recruits. On the other hand, the Ethiopian invasion of
Somalia seemed to be a strong trigger for the Somali recruits.
Discrimination. Most of the non-Somali recruits experienced some form of religious
discrimination after converting to Islam. Ruben Shumpert, in a letter to Judge Marsha Pechman,
wrote: “I can’t count how many times I’ve been called Usama bin Laden. Or my wife has been
told it looks like she is going to blow up.”94 In a handwritten statement, Daniel Maldonado
wrote that he left the United States because of anti-Muslim sentiment following the September
11, 2001 attacks: “[In Somalia] I would be able to live, pray, act, dress, and be a Muslim without
anyone yelling at me, calling me names, refusing me jobs or apartments.”95 Craig Baxam also
complained that living an Islamic way of life in the United States was oppressive. In particular,
he found the constant playing of music and the constant display of pictures disrespectful.96
Most of the Somali recruits also experienced discrimination, although this discrimination
was racial as opposed to religious. Abdirahman Mukhtar stated in his testimony before the
House Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee that “Somali youth report a
high level of discrimination and prejudice across the board.”97 The story of Shirwa Ahmed is
just one example of such discrimination. Ahmed tried to fit in at school but could not. His
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African-American peers taunted him for not being “black” and told him to go back to Africa,
prompting Ahmed to ask, “How can they be mad at me for looking like them? We’re from the
same place.”98 Abdinassir Osman also complained of discrimination: “Everywhere I would go, I
would be treated differently because I am a Somali. I can understand if I can’t get a good job
and I accept that fact as I quit school early, but even a cleaning job? It does not make sense!”99
Abikar Mohamed recalled his experience with discrimination in similar terms. When
Mohamed and his siblings got citizenship he said, “I thought I would enjoy the same treatment
and rights as any other U.S. citizen, but that was never to happen.” Mohamed said it was
impossible to get a job or even a scholarship to further his education after high school. “In as
much as we are citizens, we are never treated equally. What is the use of granting us citizenship
if they don’t treat us equally?” Mohamed explained that when he finished high school he was
among the top five students. “All the rest got scholarships to go to college; most of them did not
deserve because they come from rich families. I was in need and I did not get it even when it
was clear I deserved the scholarship.” This incident, he said, opened his eyes to the flagrant
discrimination that the system meted out to Somali-Americans and other refugee minorities.100
Blocked Mobility. Many of the non-Somali recruits complained of blocked mobility.
Omar Hammami, for example, and his friend Bernie Culveyhouse took inventory at Walmart
dressed like Salafis with their pants tucked into their socks. Their boss tolerated their odd look,
but had trouble understanding why Hammami and Culveyhouse refused to touch alcohol, pork,
Christmas cards, and even dolls. Eventually, their boss assigned them to the women’s clothing
section, at which point Culveyhouse said to Hammami, “Man, we can’t do anything in life, can
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we?” Unable to continue working in such an environment, Hammami and Culveyhouse quit that
day.101
Blocked mobility seemed to produce a feeling of unfulfilled ambition among the nonSomali recruits. Omar Hammami, for example, wrote the following in August 2006: “Where is
the desire to do something amazing? Where is the urge to get up and change yourself—not to
mention the world and other issues further off? Stop sticking to the earth and let your soul fly!”
Later, in a December 2006 e-mail message, Hammami wrote that he wanted to help his captive
brothers and sisters [in Somalia] while helping himself “obtain the highest rank available” as a
Muslim.102
Carlos Almonte expressed a similar longing to do something important. In a criminal
complaint, Almonte declared that any chance to wage violent jihad abroad was worth the risk,
“Because what’s better than sitting back here and working like a dog and . . . being somebody’s
puppy . . . than moving forward to, yanni, a life of honor, life of dignity, once Allah . . . takes
your soul upon that.”103 Ruben Shumpert also hoped to enhance his status by joining alShabaab. A biography of Shumpert, released by al-Shabaab in October 2008, states that
Shumpert “could not accept having been so powerful prior to converting to Islam, and yet being
so weak as a follower of Islam, even though he had only recently become a Muslim.”104
Some of the non-Somali recruits thought joining al-Shabaab would be a chance for
renewal. Troy Kastigar, for example, “was searching for something better, a better life.”105
Shaker Masri, in an intercepted telephone call to his girlfriend, complained that “Life is not
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worth living for me. I cannot enjoy life. I have not enjoyed it since I was eighteen. I have not
enjoyed life since I was a child. I lost that innocence. I need to regain it back.”106
Like their non-Somali counterparts, many of the Somali recruits complained of blocked
mobility. Mohamud Hassan, for example, seemed hesitant about traveling to Somalia until a
close friend was shot dead outside a youth center—the fifth slaying of a young Somali in the
Twin Cities that year. This seemed to be the tipping point for Hassan. “I used to think that death
only happens to old people,” Hassan told his friend Ruqia Mohamed. “But he was young—my
age. I guess I could die tomorrow.”107 Zakaria Maruf experienced blocked mobility in a
different way. Maruf’s criminal record foiled his search for a job, and then his plans for
marriage were stymied. When Maruf proposed to a young woman in 2005, her parents scoffed.
They did not want their daughter winding up “on welfare,” they told Maruf, who worked at
Walmart.108
Blocked mobility seemed to produce a feeling of unfulfilled ambition among the Somali
recruits, and, by default, a desire to do something notable and become someone important. Nuno
Ahmed, for example, told a journalist that “Young people like me are needed there [in Somalia]
to protect our country. I can do something important over there compared to what I was doing
back in the US.”109 Zakaria Maruf must have envisioned himself taking on an important role
within al-Shabaab before leaving Minneapolis. After arriving in Somalia, Maruf, in conference
calls to his friends, boasted that he had become a governor for al-Shabaab.110
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Political Grievance. U.S. foreign policy was the most significant contributor to a
cognitive opening in the non-Somali recruits. A biography of Ruben Shumpert released by alShabaab in October 2008 states that Shumpert “became confused after seeing the injustice of the
crusader forces in Muslim lands, and their massacre of Muslims. The conflicts in Afghanistan
and Iraq ignited the light of faith in his heart . . . He began searching for weapons and jihad.”111
Omar Hammami had dismissed politics as a worldly distraction until one afternoon when he
dropped by an Islamic bookstore and the owner, an Afghan, told them to “pray for the people of
Fallujah” (the U.S. has just invaded Fallujah for the second time). Over the next few months,
Hammami became consumed with the events in Iraq and Afghanistan and began to rethink his
nonmilitant Salafi stance. Convinced that his Salafi mentors had been “hiding many parts of the
religion that have a direct relationship to jihad and politics,” Hammami began searching for
guidance on the Internet, and, in the process, discovered a documentary about the life of Amir
Khattab, a legendary jihadist who fought in Chechnya. According to the documentary, Khattab
gave up a life that “any young man would desire” to embrace a higher purpose. Hammami was
mesmerized. Hammami’s friend, Bernie Culveyhouse, explained that “Once you’ve made that
step, it’s a gateway. Once you’ve legitimized the jihad in Chechnya, you’re compelled to
legitimize the jihad in other places as well.”112
For the Somali recruits, the Ethiopian invasion of December 2006 was highly significant
in terms of triggering a cognitive opening. The invasion brought to the fore a lifetime of identity
conflict among the Somali youth, who for the first time began to think seriously about returning
to Somalia. Journalist Andrea Elliott describes the effect the invasion had on Somali youth in
Minneapolis:
111
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[The invasion] triggered a political awakening among young Somalis in Minneapolis.
They had viewed their problems as hopelessly clan-based, but the Ethiopian campaign
simplified things. Here was an external enemy against which young Somalis could unite.
Spurred by a newfound sense of nationalism, college students distributed T-Shirts
emblazoned with the Somali flag and held demonstrations during a frigid Minnesota
winter. . . . If the Ethiopians were seen as infidel invaders, an insurgent group known as
the Shabaab—‘youth,’ in Arabic—was emerging as ‘freedom fighters.’ In its online
propaganda, the Shabaab conflated nationalist sentiments with religious ideology,
following a tactic honed by Al Qaeda.113
Based on Elliott’s description of Somali youths’ reaction to the Ethiopian invasion, it is easy to
understand why the invasion was such a pivotal moment for the recruits from Minneapolis. It
seemed to resolve the Somali youths’ identity conflict once and for all—they were Somalis and
they would join al-Shabaab to prove it.
Identity Conflict. Several experts point to identity conflict when discussing the
radicalization of Somali youth. Many of the Somali recruits in this sample experienced an
identity conflict as a result of their plight as immigrants, having to balance American culture
with Somali culture. Abdirahman Mukhtar, in a testimony before the Senate Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs Committee, stated that “Identity crisis and cultural conflict are a
reality for Somali youth. . . . Parents expect you to keep your culture, while the American
education system and way of life forces you to assimilate. . . . As a result of identity crisis and
frequent challenges, many youth lose hope and start making poor choices.”114 Shirwa Ahmed,
for example, experienced rejection at school, and at the same time faced disapproval from his
relatives for mixing with “ghetto people.”115
Mohamud Galony, a science tutor who was friends with Shirwa Ahmed and is the uncle
of another boy who left, said the root of the problem was a “crisis of belonging.” Young Somalis
had been raised to honor their families’ tribes, yet felt disconnected from them. “They want to
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belong, but who do they belong to,” said Mr. Galony.116 Omar Jamal, who runs a legal aid
society for the Somali community in Minneapolis, says the children who came to America had to
straddle two worlds. “Most of those kids are going through an identity crisis. They don’t know
who to belong to.”117
Despite their efforts to embrace mainstream society, the Somali recruits were constantly
reminded of their ethnic identity by their parents. According to Abdirahman Mukhtar, a
Minneapolis youth program manager, “[Somali] parents maintain a lifestyle that essentially is
like living from a suitcase, they hope to return.”118 Many in the Somali community refer to first
generation Somali immigrants as “Starbucks dads,” because every day men gather at Starbucks
to argue about the politics of their homeland. To some young Somali-Americans, the Starbucks
dad is a metaphor for absent parents too mired in the affairs of their home country to pay
attention to their children here.119
Remittances are yet another reminder to Somali youth of their ethnic heritage. In a
testimony before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
Professor Ken Menkhaus of Davisdon College explained the importance of remittances for the
Somali diaspora:
Remittances are by far and away the most important source of income in Somalia. . . .
The diaspora keeps much of Somalia—especially households in urban areas—alive. . . .
As a corollary, the Somali community is under enormous pressure to remit as much
money as it can to extended family members back home. The ethical obligation to assist
the extended family is absolute; a diaspora member who rejects this obligation would be
renounced by his or her clan.120
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Based on the testimony of Professor Menkhaus, it would be safe to assume that all of the Somali
recruits remained tied to Somali through remittances. Shirwa Ahmed, for example, sent half of
his income to relatives in Somalia, according to his friend Nimco Ahmed.121
Due to the influence of parents and remittances, the Somali recruits all shared a desire to
return to their homeland and experience it for themselves. A friend of Abdisalan Ali
acknowledged that “There was a desire in all of us, that our parents always talk about, the great
Somalia.”122 Mohamoud Hassan, like his fellow recruits, “longed to return to his homeland, both
to experience it for himself and to rebuild it.” His friend Ruqia Mohamed explained that “It’s
just this missing piece of us.”123
5.2.2 Ideology
Out of all the recruits, 54 percent of espoused a nationalist ideology, 38 percent espoused
a Salafist ideology, and 8 percent espoused both. The non-Somali recruits all used Salafist
language, often in the form of virulent anti-Americanism. Craig Baxam declared that if he were
living with al-Shabaab or the Taliban and the United States invaded or the host country tried to
institute a democratic government he would fight against it. He also stated that he would fight to
defend Sharia law if required and that his loyalties were to Islam and not to the United States.124
Daniel Maldonado admitted that he had “no problem” killing or fighting Americans because he
was angry with America, and added that he had “no problem” with the September 11, 2001
attacks. Maldonado also admitted that “if Americans came [to Somalia], I would fight them
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too.”125 Zachary Chesser, in an Internet posting cited by the FBI, recommended “desensitizing”
law enforcement by planting phony bombs: “A cop might walk up to a bag that someone thought
might be a bomb, so he assumes it is not. Then he bends over to open it rolling his eyes at this
waste of his time. Boom! No more kaafir [unbeliever].”126
Mohamed Alessa and Carlos Almonte were among the most violent of the non-Somali
recruits. In November 2009, Alessa said the following to Almonte:
A lot of people need to get killed, bro, swear to God . . . I have to get a . . . assault rifle
and just kill anyone that even looks at me the wrong way, bro. . . . my soul cannot rest
until I shed blood. I wanna, like, be the world’s known terrorist. . . . You don’t worship
Allah, so . . . that’s a reason for you to die. . . . Freaking Major-Nidal-shaved-facePalestinian-crazy guy; he’s not better than me. I’ll do twice what he did.127
Shaker Masri espoused a similar type of rhetoric. In a criminal complaint, Masri told a
cooperating source that he hoped to become a martyr by wearing a suicide belt: “I will not stay
idle . . . I wish to know how the explosive belt is made. . . . I will wear one and I will not take it
off.” While making final preparations to travel to Somalia, Masri observed a group of four
soldiers in military dress uniform and told the cooperating source that he wished he could walk
up to the four men and blow himself up in their presence. In response, the cooperating source
asked why Masri would want to sacrifice himself for only four targets. Masri agreed, stating it
would be better if there were more, for example, if there was a bus full of soldiers upon which
Masri could blow himself up as a martyr.128
Of the Somali recruits, 82 percent were nationalist, 6 percent were Salafist, and 12
percent were both. All of the Somalis recruits were understandably distressed by the Ethiopian
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occupation. One of the friends of the Minneapolis recruits, Ruqia Mohamed, thinks that her
friends saw themselves as “freedom fighters.”129 Statements from the recruits themselves seem
to verify this point. Mohamoud Hassan, for example, wondered, “Why are we sitting around in
America, doing nothing for our people.”130 Likewise, Nuno Ahmed informed a journalist that
“Young people like me are needed there to protect our country,” and Ali Mohamud told the same
journalist that “My services are needed back home, to protect Somalia and Islam.”131
A few of the Somali recruits espoused Salafist sentiments. A friend of the recruits
believes that, while Somali nationalism may have initially driven the recruits, their cause
eventually took on a religious cast. According to the friend, the recruits became convinced that
Somalia’s years of bloodshed were punishment from God for straying from Islam, and that the
answer was to restore the Caliphate, or Islamic rule. “If it was just nationalism, they could give
money. But religion convinced them to sacrifice their whole lives.”132 Somali community leader
Osman Ahmed believes the recruits were told that the Ethiopian occupation was “an act of
aggression against the Islamic religion.”133 Judging by their religious zeal, some of the recruits
apparently bought into this line of reasoning. Adan Hussein, for instance, acknowledged that
“There is a chance I might never come back here and might die protecting my religion,” but
admitted that “it’s a price I’m willing to pay.”134
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5.3 Social Variables
5.3.1 Self-Radicalized
For the purposes of this study, the categories “self-radicalized” and “group-radicalized”
are mutually exclusive. Of all the recruits, only two (Amir Meshal and Craig Baxam) were selfradicalized. The rest had at least some interaction with a fellow radical.
Both Amir Meshal and Craig Baxam were radicalized completely on their own, insofar as
the available data indicate. There is no evidence to suggest that Amir Meshal had any friendship
or kinship ties during the radicalization process. Likewise, Craig Baxam seems to have
undergone radicalization without any sort of group ties. Approximately seven to ten days before
he left the U.S. Army in July 2010, Baxam converted to Islam. One evening Baxam was surfing
the Internet and came across an Islamic website. After reading an article on the website about
the Day of Judgment, Baxam immediately realized that Islam was the truth and converted in
secret.135 One other recruit, Shaker Masri, might have radicalized alone if not, ironically, for the
influence of a cooperating source. The cooperating source went out of his/her way to develop a
friendship with Masri, and was with Masri for the duration of the radicalization process.136
5.3.2 Group-Radicalized
All of the recruits, with the aforementioned exceptions of Amir Meshal and Craig
Baxam, were group-radicalized, meaning they had at least some interaction with other radicals
during the radicalization process. Most of the non-Somalis met fellow radicals online, and then
proceeded to fraternize with those radicals in person. When Omar Hammami moved to Egypt,
for example, he joined an online discussion forum called Islamic Networking and began
communicating with the administrator of the forum, an American convert who also happened to
135

U.S. District Court, District of Maryland, Southern Division, United States of America v. Craig Benedict
Baxam.
136
U.S. District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, United States of America v. Shaker Masri.

54

be living in Egypt, Daniel Maldonado. Hammami and Maldonado soon met in person and began
venturing into poor neighborhoods to attend underground mosques. That summer Hammami
wrote to two Muslim friends, saying he had met “a pious brother” and was planning “a trip [to
Somalia].”137
Ruben Shumpert developed a social network while in prison and maintained that network
after being released. According to the sentencing memorandum, Shumpert operated the Crescent
Cuts Barber Shop, which served as a casual meeting place for a group of would-be jihadists in
Seattle. The group consisted of mostly African-American men with criminal histories who had
converted to Islam, either in prison or after coming into contact with prison converts later.
According to the FBI sources, the group often talked about militant jihad against the nonbelievers and about traveling overseas to fight alongside their Muslim brothers. Shumpert
maintained in his computer in the barber shop several jihad motivational DVDs which he
encouraged others to view.138
All of the Somali recruits were group-radicalized. Several recruits from the first wave
attempted to persuade their friends in the United States to come and join them in Somalia,
communicating with them via phone calls, listservs, and Facebook. Acting as recruiters, Somalis
from the first wave tried to appeal to their friends’ sense of adventure. One of the Somalis wrote
to a friend on Facebook, urging him to “Bring yourself over here” to “M-town,” where the men
carry “all types of guns.” Mohamoud Hassan told his friends that killing people was “an
adrenaline rush,” and joked that he and his fellow jihadists compared “body counts.”139 Zakaria
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Maruf also called his friends in the United States and asked them to join the fight. According to
one report, Maruf’s friends had trouble resisting his invitation because they looked up to him.140
Certain Somalis from the first wave actually returned to the United States and tried to
recruit their friends in person. According to a criminal complaint, Cabdulaahi Faarax met with
his co-co-conspirators at a residential location and told them “that he experienced true
brotherhood while fighting in Somalia and that travel for jihad was the best thing they could do. .
. . FAARAX told the co-conspirators that traveling to Somalia to fight jihad will be fun and not
to be afraid. FAARAX also explained to his co-conspirators that they would get to shoot guns in
Somalia.”141 Muhamud Omar also returned to the United States to recruit within the SomaliAmerican community. Having departed for Somalia in January 2008, Omar was the first
member of the second wave to join al-Shabaab. Omar returned to Minnesota in April 2008,
during which time he remained in contact with members of al-Shabaab. Upon his return, he
assisted other Minnesotans in their departure from Minnesota to Somalia.142
A few of the recruits explained how their friends recruited them after returning to the
United States. Adan Hussein said that he and his fellow recruits attended a mosque where one of
the elders kept them updated with the news coming from Somalia. “He had first-hand
information about what was going on at home. He would travel to Somalia and back to the U.S.
until recently when he was banned from traveling. They stopped him because he would come
back and tell us how the U.S., the country we had grown up in, was helping Ethiopia to kill our
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families.”143 Salah Osman Ahmed told a judge in July 2009 that he attended “secret meetings”
in Minneapolis starting in October 2007. There, he said, a group of guys talked about returning
to Somalia to fight Ethiopians.144
5.3.3 Internet-Radicalized
All of the recruits were radicalized online to one degree or another. Whereas the nonSomali recruits seemed to begin the radicalization process online, the Somali recruits seemed to
end the radicalization process online. On the whole, the Internet seemed to play a much larger
role for the non-Somali recruits than the Somali recruits. Daniel Maldonado, for example,
posted 2,500 times on the Islamic Network in less than a year, an average of eight times daily. 145
Mohamed Alessa and Carlos Almonte also used the Internet extensively during the
radicalization process. According to the criminal complaint, in October 2006 a member of the
public sent a tip through the FBI’s website concerning Alessa and Almonte, saying “[e]very time
they access the Internet all they look for is all those terrorist videos about Islam holly [sic] war
and where they kill US soldiers and other terrible things.” On several occasions, Alessa and
Almonte listened to recordings of Anwar al-Awlaki promoting violent jihad, martyrdom, and the
killing of civilians. In one of those recordings, “Constants on the Path to Jihad,” Awlaki
emphasizes that one does not need a leader in order to wage violent jihad. When FBI personnel
conducted a search of Almonte’s computer, they found documents authored by Osama bin
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Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and others advocating violent jihad against the perceived enemies of
Islam, including the United States.146
The Internet was important in the radicalization process for most of the recruits, but for
Zachary Chesser it was central. Jarret Brachman, a counterterrorism analyst at North Dakota
State University, states that “Chesser was positioning himself as a stand-alone al Qaeda
propaganda machine in the United States.”147 In one interview, Chesser even bragged that “I
might be mistaken, but my impression is that I was at one point operating the #1 jihadi YouTube
channel in terms of daily views.”148 Chesser explained in an affidavit that once he became
interested in Islam he began watching online videos, discussions, and debates, and over-thecounter CDs almost obsessively. He sent several e-mails to Anwar al-Awlaki, one of his idols,
and Awlaki apparently replied to two of them.149 An article by the Anti-Defamation League lists
the numerous sites on which Chesser was active: the 7th Century Generation forum, the al-Faloja
forum, the al-Qimmah forum, the Islamic Awaking forum, the Islamic Emirate forum, the
Mujahid blog, the YouTube Jihad blog, Anwar al-Awlaki’s blog, Revolution Muslim, Scribd,
Facebook, Twitter, and the YouTube—AQWAHProductions Channel.150
The Somali recruits were arguably less influenced by terrorist propaganda online, but
they nevertheless sought out propaganda at times. Joseph Lieberman, Chairman of the Senate
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, confirmed that “we know
[Internet] videos—some produced by al-Shabaab—are being watched in the Somali community
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in Minneapolis.”151 Mohamoud Hassan, for example, searched the Internet for jihadist videos
and chat rooms, and also listened to “Constants on the Path to Jihad,” the lecture by Anwar alAwlaki.152
Many of Somali recruits who became suicide bombers made recruiting tapes for their
friends back home before they died. An al-Shabaab radio station, for example, aired a recruiting
tape by Farah Beledi, who was fatally shot in May 2011 trying to detonate his bomb vest in
Mogadishu. “Brothers, come, come to jihad. You know in this world, everybody is going to die
one day. Every life goes. Some people die in car accidents. Some people, you know, they die
on a bed . . . Brothers, die like lions, you know, die for your religion.”153 Al-Shabaab also posted
an audio recording online of Abdisalan Ali’s suicide message in October 2011. In the recording,
Ali exhorts, “Don’t just sit around, you know, and be, you know, a couch potato and just like,
just chill all day. Today jihad is what is most important. It’s not important that you become a
doctor, or some sort of engineer.”154
5.3.4 Relative-Radicalized
Zachary Chesser was the only recruit to be influenced by a relative during the
radicalization process. As it turns out, that relative was Chesser’s wife, Proscovia Nzabanita.
Chesser’s wife helped distribute his online materials about South Park by reposting them on
various social networking sites and forums. In addition, she posted her own commentary on the
controversy, including one post on Facebook saying “may Allah humiliate them THE SOUTH
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PARK CREATURES.”155 Chesser’s wife eventually pled guilty to making a false statement to a
special agent investigating her husband and his attempt to travel to Somalia to join al-Shabaab.
Her plea agreement requires Nzabanita to leave the United States within 120 days and relinquish
her legal status in the United States.156
Remarkably, none of the Somali recruits were influenced by kinship ties during the
radicalization process. This runs counter to previous studies on radicalization, in which kinship
ties played a role, albeit a minor one. In Sageman’s study, for example, kinship played a role in
the affiliation of 14 percent of the mujahedin.157
5.3.5 Mosque-Radicalized
Of all the recruits, 46 percent were mosque-radicalized. Mosques featured prominently
in the radicalization process for only 11 percent of the non-Somali recruits. In fact, some of the
non-Somali recruits chose to withdraw from the local mosque after adopting Salafism. Daniel
Maldonado, for example, chose to leave the Selimiye Mosque in Methuen, Massachusetts after
leaders warned him to tone down his zealotry.158 Leaders of the Islamic Center Northern
Virginia in Fairfax said they were relieved when Zachary Chesser, another zealous convert,
chose to leave the mosque in November 2009.159
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Of the Somali recruits, 65 percent were radicalized in mosques. Abdifatah Isse
reportedly indicated that he was recruited “at a house of worship” to fight in Somalia.160
Cabdulaahi Faarax and others met at a mosque in the fall of 2007 to call a co-conspirator in
Somalia.161 Likewise, Omer Mohamed attended meetings at a Minneapolis mosque where he
and his co-conspirators formed a secret plan for Somali men residing in Minneapolis to travel to
Somali to fight.162 Not all of the Somali recruits were mosque-radicalized. Adan Hussein, for
example, denied that he and his fellow recruits had been brainwashed by elders at the mosque.163
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6. CAUSAL FLOW DIAGRAMS
Causal flow diagramming is a technique for visualizing complex cause-and-effect
relationships. In this study, causal flow diagramming will be used to visualize the radicalization
processes for two groups of al-Shabaab recruits: non-Somalis and Somalis. The first step in
causal flow diagramming is to identify major factors in a cause-and-effect system. In the results
section, the author identified the major factors contributing to radicalization for non-Somalis and
Somalis. With the major factors identified, the next step is to identify cause-and-effect
relationships among the factors. Table 6.1 and table 6.2 show the cause-and-effect relationships
among the most important factors in the radicalization process for non-Somalis and Somalis,
respectively.
Table 6.1: Causal and Affected Factors for Non-Somalis

Causal Factor
Non-immigrant community
Salafist propaganda online
Adoption of Salafism
Conversion
Increased religiosity
Discrimination
Blocked mobility
Unfulfilled ambition
Quit job/drop out of school
Political grievances
Cognitive opening
Virulent anti-Americanism
Extremist social media
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Affected Factor
Salafist propaganda online
Adoption of Salafism
Conversion
Increased religiosity
Discrimination
Blocked mobility
Unfulfilled ambition
Quit job/drop out of school
Political grievances
Cognitive opening
Virulent anti-Americanism
Extremist social media
Travel to Somalia alone

Table 6.2: Causal and Affected Factors for Somalis

Causal Factor
Immigrant community
Attempts to assimilate
Discrimination
Blocked mobility
Unfulfilled ambition
Identity conflict
Cognitive opening
Interest in remigration
Secret group meetings
Increased religiosity
Isolation













Affected Factor
Attempts to assimilate
Discrimination
Blocked mobility
Unfulfilled ambition
Identity conflict
Cognitive opening
Interest in remigration
Secret group meetings
Increased religiosity
Isolation
Travel to Somalia in groups

The third step in causal flow diagramming is to characterize the cause-and-effect
relationships as direct or inverse. Unfortunately, the literature on radicalization rarely addresses
the issue of deradicalization among terrorist recruits, making it difficult to find any inverse
relationships that might exist. An inverse relationship might exist between certain Somali
recruits’ aversion to violence and their hesitancy to travel to Somalia. However, any information
on this aversion to violence, and other deradicalization factors for that matter, are circumstantial
at best. Regardless of whether relationships can be characterized as direct or inverse, causal flow
diagrams can still be developed. The causal flow diagrams in this study display four types of
lines: bolded, normal, dashed, and colored. Bolded lines represent the primary radicalization
pathway, normal lines represent secondary radicalization pathways, dashed lines represent
radicalization inputs, and colored lines represent feedback loops.
6.1 Non-Somalis
The causal flow diagram for the non-Somali recruits is depicted in Figure 6.1.
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Figure 6.1: Causal Flow Diagram for Non-Somalis
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Almost every non-Somali recruit begins the radicalization process in a non-immigrant
community. At some point the individual is introduced to an Islamic, though not necessarily a
radical, social network. Introduction to an Islamic social network typically happens through
friendship ties, although it may also happen through kinship ties or prison ties. Once the
individual is introduced to an Islamic social network, newfound feelings of acceptance,
camaraderie, and brotherhood induce the individual to convert to Islam. Marriage into the
Islamic social network often follows conversion.
After converting to Islam, the individual endeavors to follow the tenants of Islam
zealously. However, over time orthodox Islam fails to meet the individual’s religious needs, and,
as a result, individual turns to the Internet in search of a more rigorous version of Islam. While
on the Internet, the individual discovers Salafist propaganda, which the individual begins to
devour obsessively. With enough exposure, the individual becomes convinced that Salafism is
the purest expression of Islam. Thereafter the individual commits to Salafism whole-heartedly,
adopting Salafist dress, appearance, and rhetoric. Inevitably, this outward display of religiosity
brings discrimination upon the individual from the mainstream society. In certain instances, the
individual’s fanaticism even creates conflict with the individual’s local spiritual leaders.
Maintaining a Salafist lifestyle in the United States proves extremely difficult for the
individual. In most cases, a Salafist lifestyle makes it difficult for the individual to hold down a
job and focus on scholastic endeavors. His professional and academic progress stymied, the
individual realizes he cannot function in secular society anymore, and promptly quits his job and
drops out of school to dedicate himself to the pursuit of Salafism full-time. Sometimes the
individual even moves to an immigrant community to live closer to fellow Salafists. In any case,
at this stage the individual beings to look at Salafism for the first time through a political lens.
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Embittered by his recent series of setbacks, the individual becomes convinced that American
society is the source of all his problems. The individual begins to identify with the suffering of
the global ummah, especially those Muslims in Iraq and Afghanistan who oppressed by their
American occupiers. This political grievance triggers a cognitive opening, allowing the
individual to countenance violent Salafism for the first time. If American society is intrinsically
opposed to Islam, the individual reasons, then American society must be destroyed.
Not surprisingly, the individual becomes virulently anti-American at this point. With a
politically-charged mindset and growing angst, the individual joins social networking forums
online to meet other extremists. Sometimes the individual arranges face-to-face meetings with
these extremists. Whatever the case, conversations with other extremists ultimately persuade the
individual that jihad is the only way to right the injustices heaped upon Muslims by the United
States. When the individual learns that al-Shabaab is on the verge of creating a true Islamic state
in Somalia, he concludes that al-Shabaab is at the vanguard of the Salafist movement and, hence,
an organization worthy of his support. As furtively as possible, the individual travels to Somalia
by himself and attempts to join al-Shabaab. If the individual is lucky, he survives long enough to
become a recruiter for al-Shabaab, in which capacity the individual develops Salafist propaganda
for other potential jihadists in the United States to view online.
6.2 Somalis
The radicalization process for Somalis is altogether different than the radicalization
process for non-Somalis, as the following causal diagram demonstrates (see figure 6.2).
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Figure 6.2: Causal Flow Diagram for Somalis
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Unlike their non-Somali counterparts, the Somalis recruits start out in immigrant
communities. In their communities, the Somali youth attempt to blend into mainstream society,
imitating American behavior and dress while avoiding drugs, gangs, and the more unsavory
aspects of the urban experience. Despite their earnest attempts to fit in, the Somali youth face
routine discrimination from their peers. Nevertheless, many of the youth perform well in high
school and make it to college, all the while working odd jobs to support their families.
Eventually, however, the youth grow tired of what they perceive to be a stagnant situation and
they develop a desire to do something more meaningful with their lives.
At this point the youth are primed to experience an identity conflict. Although they
appear to be headed in the right direction academically and professionally, the youth
continuously struggle to balance their Somali identity with their American identity. On the one
hand, the youth are constantly reminded of their Somali heritage: their parents incessantly
discuss Somali affairs, and, on a regular basis, the youth send remittances back to distant
relatives in Somalia. On the other hand, the youth are constantly treated like outsiders at school
and at work, despite the fact that they have lived most of their lives in the United States.
Unbeknownst to the youth, a solution to their identity conflict is at hand. In December
2006, news of the Ethiopian invasion spreads rapidly throughout the community, and, in an
instant, the youths’ ethnic identity becomes supremely relevant. Spurred by deep-seated
nationalism, the youth feel an overwhelming urge to return to Somalia and liberate their country.
The thought of traveling to Somalia as freedom fighters makes the youth feel important for the
first time in their lives. Having spent most of their lives hearing about Somalia, the youth now
have a chance to experience it first-hand and to reshape their country’s destiny. At once the
youth begin meeting secretly in groups to discuss what should be done. Together, the youth
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convince themselves that the Ethiopian invasion is not just an attack on the government, but an
assault on Islam as well. By default, the youths’ mission to repel the Ethiopians now becomes a
mission to install an Islamic government as well. As the recruits prepare to save their homeland
and Islam, they become increasingly religious and withdraw from society. Many of the youth
seek out Salafist propaganda to reassure themselves that their cause is just.
Eventually the youth persuade themselves that al-Shabaab is a legitimate organization
and that the pursuit of jihad is a worthy goal. They arrange to travel to Somalia in groups,
relying on peer support to maintain their enthusiasm. After arriving in Somalia, some of the
youth discover their romanticized vision of al-Shabaab does not match reality. These youth
became disillusioned and attempt to flee. Some escape and make it back to the United States,
while some fail and are executed for betrayal. For other youth, al-Shabaab becomes the perfect
vehicle for self-expression and a source of fulfillment. Some of these youth choose to stay in
Somalia and fight, communicating regularly with their friends in the United States through
Facebook, phone calls, and listservs. Others return to the United States as recruiters for
successive waves of Somali recruits.
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7. FEEDBACK LOOPS
Feedback loops, in which two or more factors are linked circularly, are the most powerful
force in a causal flow diagram. The author identified two feedback loops for non-Somalis and
one for Somalis. The first feedback loop for non-Somalis is between “virulent antiAmericanism” and “extremist social media” (see figure 7.1).
D
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D

Figure 7.1: Feedback Loop for Non-Somalis

Strong anti-American sentiments motivated the non-Somali recruits to participate in extremist
forums online, and the jihadist dialogue in these forums intensified feelings of anti-Americanism.
The second feedback loop is between “virulent anti-Americanism,” “extremist social media,”
and “group meetings in person” (see figure 7.2).
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Figure 7.2: Feedback Loop for Non-Somalis

As explained earlier, strong anti-Americanism sentiments motivated the non-Somali recruits to
participate in extremist forums online. Sometimes the non-Somali recruits arranged for face-to-
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face meetings with their jihadist cyber friends. The result of these meetings was an even greater
hatred of America.
The only feedback loop for Somalis is between “secret group meetings” and “interest in
remigration” (see figure 7.3).
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Figure 7.3: Feedback Loop for Somalis

During secret group meetings, the Somali youth discussed the possibility of fighting the
Ethiopians, which naturally increased their interest in returning to Somalia. This interest in
remigration led to further group meetings in which the youth cemented their resolve to return to
Somalia and made the necessary arrangements to do so.
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8. DISCUSSION
Taken together, the calculated percentages, causal flow diagrams, and feedback loops
reveal two distinct radicalization processes: one for non-Somalis and one for Somalis. An
individual’s ethnicity largely determined whether the individual would be radicalized within an
immigrant community or not, and place of recruitment largely dictated which radicalization
pathway the individual would follow. Certain variables that were important in one radicalization
pathway were not important in the other, and vice versa.
The educational attainment of the Somali recruits was much higher than expected. The
author hypothesized that the Somali recruits, on average, would have no more than a high school
education. Ignorance, the author assumed, would make the Somali youth vulnerable to
radicalization. Results showed, however, that a much higher percentage of Somalis than
expected (47 percent) attended college. This percentage is perplexing because the Somali
immigrant community as a whole is notoriously undereducated. The Somali youths’ aboveaverage educational attainment refutes any argument that they were brainwashed or that they
blindly decided to travel to Somalia for jihad. Even so, the decision to wage jihad was no doubt
an emotional one, as it was made during an epoch of frenzied nationalism. Nationalistic fervor
seemed to override the moderating influence of a college education.
Just as more Somali recruits were college-educated than expected, more Somali recruits
were also employed than expected. The author hypothesized that a majority of the Somali
recruits would be unemployed, and, as a result, that they would be searching for a purpose in life.
However, the percentage of Somalis who were unemployed at the time of recruitment was much
lower than expected (14 percent). Considering the widespread poverty among Somali immigrant
community, this result is again perplexing. Although the Somali recruits did develop perceptions
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of blocked mobility and unfulfilled ambition, the source of these perceptions turned out to be
discrimination rather than unemployment. Still, most of the Somali recruits were students with
either unskilled or semiskilled jobs. Since these jobs were neither high-paying nor permanent,
the Somali recruits seemed perfectly willing to quit when a more fulfilling job opportunity arose
(i.e., the opportunity to defend their homeland).
Family status was an important variable for the non-Somali recruits, 50 percent of whom
were married.164 Despite the fact that half of the non-Somali recruits were married, it is unclear
how marriage affected their radicalization process, except in the case of Zachary Chesser and his
wife. The causal flow diagram for the non-Somali recruits reveals that those who married did so
after converting to Islam. In every case, the recruit’s wife was not nearly as radical as the recruit
himself, as demonstrated by the fact that all the married recruits traveled, or at least attempted to
travel, to Somalia alone. However, wives probably gave their husbands valuable emotional
support throughout the radicalization process.
Criminality did not play a significant role in the radicalization process for the sample as a
whole. Although some recruits compiled a criminal record, this was the exception rather than
the rule. Moreover, simply having a criminal record did not appear to affect the radicalization
process to any significant degree. Crime only affected the radicalization process in situations
where it led to prison and association with Islamic social networks inside prison.
Religious background and ideology were immensely important in distinguishing the nonSomali recruits from the Somali recruits. Eighty-nine percent of the non-Somali recruits were
converts to Islam, and all of them exposed a Salafist ideology. In contrast, none of the Somali
recruits were converts, and only 18 percent of them espoused a Salafist ideology. These results
164

Unfortunately, a lack of data made it difficult to determine if family status was a significant variable for the
Somali recruits. Additional data would more than likely reveal that most of the most of the Somali recruits were
single.
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confirm author’s hypothesis that the non-Somali recruits would be motivated primarily by
Salafism and that the Somali recruits would be motivated primarily by nationalism. Based on the
fact that all of the non-Somali recruits adopted Salafism after converting to Islam, the author
believes that there is a powerful link between religious background and ideology. Simply stated,
converts to Islam tend to grow more extreme in their views than individuals who have been
Muslims all their life. Many of the Somali recruits grew disillusioned with al-Shabaab after
joining, but all of the non-Somali recruits became more extreme in their views. Jehad Mostapha
and Omar Hammami, for example, went on to become key leaders within the organization.
Date of departure to Somalia ended up being significant, as hypothesized, for the Somali
recruits, all of whom left for Somalia after the Ethiopian invasion of December 2006. From a
psychological perspective, this makes sense. The Ethiopian invasion brought out the identity
conflict that had been festering inside the Somali youth ever since their migration to the United
States. For the non-Somali recruits, the insurgency in Somalia was not significant from a
cultural perspective, but rather from a religious perspective. Somalia seemed to be on the verge
of becoming a pure Islamic state, and that was enough to entice the recent Muslim convert who
wanted to practice Salafism without opposition from mainstream society. When the non-Somali
recruit left for Somalia was not important, as long as the recruit made it Somalia at some point.
In line with the author’s hypothesis, the vast majority of the recruits were radicalized in
groups. The nature of these groups depended on which radicalization pathway the recruits
followed. While the non-Somali recruits forged friendship ties with other extremists online, the
Somali recruits turned to preexisting social networks within their community. Peer
encouragement ultimately persuaded the both sets of recruits that al-Shabaab was a legitimate
organization and that its cause was just. The Somali recruits were fortunate in that recruiters
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made all the logistical arrangements for their travel to Somalia, whereas the non-Somali recruits
had to purchase tickets and fly to Somalia on their own. The results of this study are in line with
social networking and social movement theory, which emphasize the importance of social bonds
during the radicalization process.
It should come as no surprise that the Internet facilitated radicalization for every single
recruit in the sample. Depending on their radicalization pathway, recruits used the Internet in
different ways and at different times. For example, after converting to Islam, all of the nonSomali recruits took advantage of passive Internet systems (i.e., reading, listening to, and
watching Salafist propaganda online).165 Only when the non-Somali recruits transitioned from
peaceful Salafism to violent Salafism did they turn to active Internet systems—Facebook,
Twitter, forums, blogs, and so forth—to communicate with fellow extremists.
The Internet played a different role in the radicalization process for Somalis. The Somali
recruits first began using active Internet systems—mostly Facebook—as a means to
communicate with friends who had already joined al-Shabaab overseas. Through Facebook
posts, Somali recruits overseas tried to persuade their friends back home that jihad was exciting
and rewarding, thus appealing to their sense of adventure and their need for fulfillment in life.
Later on, as the Somali recruits became more religious, some of them turned to passive Internet
systems to explore Salafist propaganda. As the foregoing explanation demonstrates, the Somali
recruits went from active to passive Internet systems, while their non-Somali counterparts did the
opposite.
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The non-Somalis refer, in particular, to the videos of Omar Hammami and the lectures of Anwar al-Awlaki as
major sources of inspiration online.

75

9. CONCLUSION
This study examined the radicalization process for al-Shabaab’s American recruits. Since
2005, 41 Americans have left the United States to join al-Shabaab for jihad in Somalia. While
most of these recruits are second-generation Somali-Americans, a substantial proportion are
native-born Americans. Although these two groups of Americans ended up in the same place
with the same terrorist organization, their pathways for getting there were vastly different. Any
policy intended to combat al-Shabaab radicalization in the United States should take into account
the radicalization processes for both groups of recruits.
9.1 Implications
Even though this study was limited to al-Shabaab recruitment in the United States, it still
has broader implications for terrorist recruiting elsewhere. First, recruits from diaspora
communities in general undergo a specialized process of radicalization, the crux of which is an
identity conflict. Immigrant youth are caught between two worlds: on the one hand
discrimination pushes them away from the host society, and on the other hand nationalism pulls
them toward their homeland. Ethno-nationalist terrorist organizations target diaspora
communities, knowing that individuals in these communities are struggling to find their identity.
These organizations present vulnerable individuals with an alternative identity, one that will
make them feel important and give them a purpose in life.
Another implication of the study has to do with the broader issue of terrorist recruiting in
the United States. Al-Shabaab’s successful recruitment of American citizens proves that the
United States is on the same trajectory as Europe. In the past, counterterrorism officials assumed
that immigrant communities in the United States were more assimilated than immigrant
communities in Europe and therefore immune to radicalization, but al-Shabaab’s recruiting
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triumph has effectively dispelled that myth. Al-Shabaab’s success speaks volumes about the
assimilation status of immigrant communities in the United States and the power of the Internet
as a recruiting tool. As one of the leading terrorist organizations in terms of online propaganda,
al-Shabaab has discovered the secret to attracting recruits from overseas diaspora communities.
Causal flow diagrams like the ones depicted in this study can be beneficial to
policymakers who prefer to visualize the radicalization process before deciding where to
intervene. By examining the relative importance of each factor in a causal flow diagram,
policymakers can determine at which stage(s) counterradicalization measures would be most
effective. For example, analysis of the causal flow diagram for Somali-Americans suggests that
efforts to mitigate radicalization within this community should start at the discrimination stage.
If policymakers work to combat discrimination of Somalis when they are young, those Somalis
will be less likely to experience a massive identity conflict as they mature.
9.2 Limitations
One of the limitations of this study was a lack of data regarding individual motivations
for joining al-Shabaab. News articles, legal documents, and congressional hearings provided
extensive biographical information, but very little information on individual recruits’ thought
processes. Obviously, such information is critical for assessing the psychological components of
radicalization. Perhaps the only way to obtain such personalized information would be to
conduct interviews with the recruits themselves. However, due to financial and time constraints,
such interviews were not feasible. Scholars looking to expand research on this topic, or one
similar to it, would be wise to arrange interviews with recruits to garner information from them
regarding their motivations for participating in terrorism.
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Another limitation for this study was the small sample size. Previous studies on
radicalization gather data on hundreds of recruits, yet this study was restricted to a mere 41
recruits. Such a limited sample size made it difficult to detect patterns and develop models to
explain radicalization. A larger sample size might reveal inaccuracies in the author’s causal flow
diagrams, or at least help the author to further refine the diagrams. One possible avenue for
future research would be to expand the sample size to include al-Shabaab recruits in diaspora
communities throughout the world, not just those in the United States.
Despite the limitations of this study, the results of this study are at least sufficient to warn
counterterrorism officials and policymakers that terrorist recruiting within the United States is
taking place at an increased rate. Other immigrant communities, in addition to the Somali
immigrant community, might be vulnerable to terrorist recruitment in the future. This study also
provides evidence of the trend toward online radicalization. The Internet, in particular social
media, is playing an increasingly vital role in the radicalization process. Counterterrorism
officials and policymakers should dedicate additional resources toward improving relations with
immigrant communities and toward combatting extremism online.
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APPENDIX
Al-Shabaab’s American Recruits
Name
Jehad Serwan Mostafa
Omar Shafik Hammami
Ruben Luis Leon Shumpert
Amir Mohamed Meshal
Daniel Joseph Maldonado
Cabdulaahi Ahmed Faarax

Alias
Ahmed, Emir Anwar, Anwar
Abu Mansoor al-Amriki
Amir Abdul Muhaimin
Daniel al-Jughaifi
Adaki, Maradadi, Smiley, Hayakallah

Omar Mohamad
Dahir Gurey
Shirwa Ahmed
Kamal Said Hassan
Salah Osman Ahmed
Abdifatah Yusuf Isse
Ahmed Ali Omar
Umar Muhammad Jama
Khalid Mohamud Abshir
Mahamud Said Omar
Zakaria Maruf
Mustafa Ali Salat
Mohamed Abdullahi Hassan
Abdikadir Ali Abdi
Jamal Sheikh Bana
Troy Matthew Kastigar
Abdisalan Hussein Ali
Burhan Hussein Hassan
Mohamoud Hassan
Abdiweli Yassin Isse
Farah Mohamed Beledi
Zachary Adam Chesser

Abshir
Salman
Omar
Mustafa
Abdul, Abdullah
Abu Muslim
Miski

Abdirahman
Bullethead
Little Bashir
Bashir Maxamed Caydid
Farhan, Walaalo
Bloody, Asadullah, Ghetto
Abu Talhah al-Amriki

Carlos Eduardo Almonte
Mohamed Mahmood Alessa
Shaker Masri
Abdinassir Osman
Abdirahman Gullet
Abikar Mohamed
Adan Hussein
Ali Mohamud
Nuno Ahmed
Craig Benedict Baxam
Abdirashid Omar
Abu Muslim
Abu Yaxye
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Date of Departure
2005
2006, November
2006, November
2006, December
2006, December
2007
2009, October 5
2007
2007, October 30
2010
2007, December 4
2007, December 6
2007, December 6
2007, December 8
2007, December 8
2007, December 8
2007, December 12
2008, January
2008, February 23
2008, August 2
2008, August 2
2008, November 3
2008, November 3
2008, November 3
2008, November 4
2008, November 4
2008, November 4
2009, October 5
2009, October 5
2009, November
2010, July 10
2010, June 5
2010, June 5
2010, August
2011, June 27
2011, June 27
2011, June 27
2011, June 27
2011, June 27
2011, June 27
2011, December 20
?
?
?

CIRRICULUM VITA
Matthew W. Richardson enrolled at Brigham Young University in September 2002.
While pursuing his bachelor’s degree, Matthew interned at BAE Systems, Inc. in 2008 and
completed an Arabic language study abroad in Amman, Jordan in 2009. Matthew graduated
from Brigham Young University in August 2009 with a bachelor’s degree in geography
(geospatial intelligence emphasis) and a minor in Arabic. In August 2010, Matthew began the
Intelligence and National Security Studies master’s program at the University of Texas at El
Paso. While pursuing his master’s degree, Matthew interned at the U.S. Department of State’s
Bureau of Intelligence and Research in 2011.

Permanent Address:
627 72nd St
Springfield, OR 97478

This thesis was typed by Matthew W. Richardson
87

